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This research explores how disabled members of the general public understand 
mental health and it’s causes, from the perspective of public mental health (PMH) 
and the social determinants (SDH). All participants self-identified as disabled based 
upon diagnosis received from healthcare professionals. Existing research into PMH 
and SDH does not distinguish mental from physical health. This qualitative research 
into health generally suggests the public have complex understandings of structural 
causes. Psychological research does examine mental health independently but does 
not incorporate structural explanations. It is therefore unclear as to how the public 
conceptualise mental health, its causes or what influences different frameworks 
being drawn upon. Within SDH research, lived experiences and many social 
locations have been excluded, included disability.  
 
The current research utilised qualitative interview methodology and thematic analysis 
to examine how disabled members of the public conceptualise mental health, its 
causes, and what processes influence different models being drawn upon.  
 
Four themes were constructed. The first regarded the impact of the language of 
health. The second identified that ‘mental health’ was conceptualised through social 
norm violation. The third incorporated the participants negotiation of labelling using 
psychiatric diagnosis and social categories. The final theme included different causal 
models of mental health, namely individualised, embodied causes relating to 
physical disabilities, oppressive ideologies and institutions.  
 
There were many complexities to this research, including the multiple definitions and 
meanings of disability with their corresponding epistemological stance, multiple 
ideological frameworks that influence the SDH and difficulties with utilising an 
intersectional lens. Exploring these themes whilst conducting the research has 
raised more questions than answers, and as such it has been challenging to draw 
concrete conclusions. Despite this, I have suggested that future research considers 
the role of emotional processes in influencing which conceptual models are drawn 




Firstly, to work with the public to develop a shared language for different 
conceptualisations of mental health, causal models and social locations. Secondly, 
before work can begin on primary prevention, I would suggest that PMH may work 
with public services including health and social care and the police to minimise 
iatrogenic harm that serves to perpetuate the unequal access to resources by 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This chapter begins with my relationship to and the development of the topic area. 
Challenges with interdisciplinary research will be addressed and my epistemological 
standpoint as well as clarifying linguistic choices. Subsequently, relevant concepts 
will be introduced, and contributions from relevant fields summarised. Critiques of 
what is ‘known’ alongside gaps will be interwoven and discussed throughout, 
culminating in the research questions.  
 
1.1 Contextual Position  
 
The development of this research project has been complex, due in part to my 
relationship to the topic area and to the Coronavirus-19 pandemic. It is essential to 
me that my work aligns with my core value of social justice. It is from this stance that 
I wanted to shape my contribution to public health. Due to the pandemic, my original 
research proposal had to be changed quickly, in a period of significant uncertainty 
and social isolation. My original project had planned to recruit staff of Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, and to explore their underlying conceptual frameworks used 
to understand mental health and their explanations of why services are structured in 
the way that they are. This was because I felt that current mental health services, 
reactive and under the umbrella of the NHS, are less aligned to an understanding of 
wellbeing as defined through the social determinants of health model (SDH), and I 
wanted to investigate whether this was due to systemic barriers, or the 
commissioner’s own constructions of mental health. As the COVID-19 pandemic 
began to unfold, I realised it may be unlikely that I would be able to recruit 
commissioners to engage in interviews, which lead to me needing to revise my 
research proposal. I wanted to retain the focus on understanding conceptual 
frameworks but needed to consider who to recruit. The personal difficulties I 
experienced during the pandemic, exacerbated by having to change topic, served to 
strengthen my resolve because I could see the importance of the topic coming alive 
around me, the health inequalities I was researching so sharply exacerbated in the 
public health responses (Sisters of Frida, 2020). It felt like this period could be a 
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catalyst for change, for myself personally, to public mental health (PMH) and to a 
country arguably shaped by systemic discrimination, through structures and systems 
that privilege the needs of those who meet particular norms (Compton & Shim, 
2014), one that needed to be capitalised upon. Because of these inequalities and my 
underlying values relating to social justice, I did not want to contribute to the 
phenomenon in which the majority of mainstream, western psychological research is 
conducted with norm-aligning participants, such as those who can be classed as 
White, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Developed (WEIRD) (Henrich, Heine and 
Norenzayan, 2010). I therefore began the research the impact of the pandemic, both 
of the virus itself and of the governments response, which is where I came across 
the abovementioned Sisters of Frida research, alongside attended as many remote 
workshops as possible that related to this area. I was repeatedly struck by unequal 
impact upon disabled people, something I felt was silent in mainstream news. Not 
only did I find this appalling, I was also shocked at the extent of my own ignorance. I 
therefore decided to use the thesis as a learning opportunity, where I could dedicate 
substantial time to researching this area, to better myself both personally and 
professionally. The pressures involved in this led to the re-imagining the project was 
time consuming, which inevitability, when deadlines are to be adhered to, has led to 
some limitations, of which I have attempted to be reflexive of throughout. These will 
be discussed in detail section 4.5.   
 
1.1.1 Epistemic Reflexivity   
Public health is a multi-disciplinary area of practice (Jarvis et al., 2020) and as such, 
research from a number of disciplines is relevant. It is beyond the scope of this 
research to explore all of the relevant ideas in depth, and as such pertinent 
information will inevitably have been excluded. My philosophical stance is used to 
reflexively explore the selection of material deemed relevant. I ascribe to Critical 
Realism (CR) as set forth by Pilgrim (2017), of which he proposes there are three 
components. Firstly, CR takes a realist ontological stance which acknowledges the 
existence of a mind independent reality. This is an imperative stance within public 
health, as it acknowledges the very real and potentially distressing impact of material 
circumstances. A wholly realist position would mean that there are ‘facts’ or ‘truth’ 
that can be discovered. However, as the epistemological position is relativist, CR 
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recognises that all knowledge is value laden. The ways reality is related to and made 
sense of is construed through language in social interactions and so is influenced by 
available discourses in the cultural and socio-political context. Therefore, we can 
transform reality, through our understanding upon which actions are based, but 
these possibilities are constrained by the real material conditions in which we are 
positioned. Pilgrim (2017) defines the final component of CR as judgemental 
rationalism. This means that because of the realist ontology, there is a reality upon 
which we can evaluate the different accounts of reality which arise through relativist 
epistemology. There is no value free knowledge, or way of knowing, and so whilst all 
perspectives contribute to the knowledge base, not all perspectives are deemed to 
be of equal weighting. It has been explicitly called upon for public health research to 
combine what is deemed ‘credible’ evidence with attention to the values embedded 
within this (Smith, 2013) which I use in support of my decision to take this position.  
 
I used the principle of judgemental rationalism to consider which disciplines and their 
corresponding account of reality to privilege and which to subjugate here. I am 
weighing these up based upon two assumptions. Firstly, each discipline itself will 
take a philosophical stance, and subsequently be based upon different assumptions 
about what there is to be known, ways of knowing and who can know them, rather 
than representing a more or less accurate depiction of reality. These assumptions 
can lead to the devaluing or exclusion of certain knowledges (Harper, et al., 2020), 
known as epistemic exclusion (Dotson, 2014). Because of these exclusions, different 
disciplines and methods are useful for providing different information, and all of these 
have some limitations. Because of these epistemological differences and limitations 
of the multiple contributing fields the field of public health is unlikely to ever be 
cohesive (Garthwaite et al., 2016). Its main aim is arguably to create a more just 
society, and in order to do this we need to value these epistemological and 
contextual differences between disciplines and what they claim to know, because 
this can open a new space for understanding that is not hegemonical (Josewitz, 
2016) and that can utilise and combine, with critical awareness, the helpful 
contributions from each perspective. I believe it is only within a space such as this 
that we can hope to understand holistically the complexity and diversity of a 
heterogenous population. This is important because interventions and ways of acting 
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are designed based upon understandings, so without this complex understanding, 
we cannot develop similarly complex, appropriate interventions.  
 
Secondly, in line with CR, I comprehend the different disciplines to simply represent 
different accounts of reality. From the judgemental rationalism position, the 
perspectives I have privileged here are those that I believe best contribute to a social 
justice aim and/or the capture the necessary complexity for public health. These 
decisions reflect my experience, self, and understanding of the world, and so I am 
writing in the first person to take ownership of this, positioning it as just one of many 
ways in which to construct an understanding of PMH but one that is inherently mine. 
Inevitably, there are conceptual and epistemological challenges to independently 
integrating multi-disciplinary perspectives, and I may make theoretical or practical 
mistakes in the neighbouring fields (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2017). On balance, it is felt 
that these mistakes are justifiable in the context of the necessity to move towards a 
conceptualisation of public health that resides in space between disciplines, equally 
valuing the contribution of each.  
 
 1.2 Language, Definitions and Conceptual Frameworks 
 
In order to locate the research within its context and make explicit how I have used 
judgemental rationalism to privilege certain perspectives, I will highlight the values 
underpinning my selection of material through reflecting on and providing rational for 
the language used.  
 
1.2.1 Public Health 
Public health refers to any organised societal measures, implemented at the 
population level, to prevent illness and disease and to promote wellbeing, especially 
those that are under government provision and regulation. Wellbeing refers to living 
a satisfying, meaningful and contributing life, more than the absence of ill health 
(World Health Organisation [WHO], 2014), and as encompassing cultural, spiritual, 
economic, political, social and biomedical aspects (Josewski, 2017).  
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1.2.2 Public Mental Health 
Historically, public health research has not explicitly distinguished what it means by 
‘health’ but most often addressed physical health problems, frequently infectious 
diseases (Berridge, 2009). Contributors in the field have expanded their thinking to 
consider social factors but is still implicitly associated with physical health, for 
example in a study asking experts to explain what they mean by health in this 
context, they refer to disease and mortality rates, rather than mental health or 
wellbeing (L’Hôte et al., 2018). Only recently, these social factors have been 
explicitly addressed regarding mental health (Compton & Shim, 2015; Larsson, 
2015; WHO, 2014). PMH has often been discussed without an explicit 
deconstruction of what is meant by mental health. Examination of relevant 
documents suggest that this continues to be underpinned by a physical health 
framework, which, in the context of mental health, constitutes psychiatric diagnoses. 
Therefore, PMH then can be seen as an extension of public health, rather than 
conceptually distinct. When I refer to PMH, I am referring to this extension, where 
mental health is implicitly understood via a physical health framework.  
 
1.2.3 Different Conceptualisations of Mental Health  
Within the mental health professions there remains an ongoing debate as to what 
constitutes mental health (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008). This complicates the question as 
to what causes mental health problems and promotes mental wellbeing. This is 
problem is bi-directional, because different assumptions are made about the nature 
of mental health depending on the believed cause (Schomerus et al., 2013). In 
professional debates, conceptualisations of mental health vary and are dependent 
on philosophical stance and theoretical alignment. There are many different 
conceptualisations, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover them all. The 
philosophical position of mainstream research, theorising and policy appears to be 
realist both ontologically and epistemologically (Rapley, 2011). Even within this is a 
plethora of alternative ways to conceptualise mental health. The dominant is the 
medical model, as in PMH, with psychologists traditionally reacting to what they 
conceptualise as ‘illness’ rather than promoting wellness (Hinshaw & Stier, 2008). 
This model assumes there is actual organic underlying biological abnormalities that 
lead to actual conditions, which can be identified so long as the symptoms are 
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correctly observed (Bentall, 2004). Criticisms of this model are due to concerns with 
validity and reliability of diagnostic categories (Pilgrim, 2017). Critics, from a relativist 
epistemology, instead understand mental health to be situated within its social, 
cultural and historical context, and so encapsulates a judgement about what is 
distressing and/or deviates from social norms at any given time, in any given place 
(Johnstone & Dallos, 2013). There is similarly a multitude of conceptualisations of 
mental health under this umbrella. For example, liberation approaches conceptualise 
mental health as an enactment of social oppression in social structures, relationships 
and discourses (Afuape & Hughes, 2015). As the psychiatric conceptualisation is 
that which is implicitly assumed in the majority of public health discourse, this is the 
meaning I will be denoting throughout this chapter.  
 
1.2.4 The Social Determinants of Health  
Population level epidemiological data indicates that certain social demographic 
groups experience poorer health outcomes than others (Albee, 1999).The social 
determinants of health (SDH) is an explanatory model that attempts to explain these 
health inequalities, through conceptualising the ways in which social and structural 
factors at the population level shape health. This is opposed to attributing this to 
inherent factors associated to the group. It was historically developed around 
physical health but have recently been broadened out to address mental health 
explicitly (Compton & Shim, 2015, p.420; WHO, 2014). 
 
The WHO (2014) define the SDH as the conditions in which people are born, grow 
up, work and live, conceptualising the main SDH as unemployment, poor education, 
poor housing, food insecurity and neighbourhood deprivation. Compton and Shim 
(2015) explain that these environmental factors are influenced by the unequal 
distribution of opportunities, resources and power amongst different social groups. 
This itself is a result of public policy, the rules and legislation of society, and social 
norms, the values and attitudes held at a societal level. These social norms 
subjugate and discriminate against individuals from certain groups, which seep into 
and influence public and political will, leading to public policy also marginalising the 
needs of certain groups. These norms are influenced by overarching ideologies and 
therefore determine which groups’ needs are privileged and hence, which are 
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afforded more opportunities to access the adequate physical and mental resources 
that shape wellbeing, named the SDH. Compton and Shim (2015) explain that it is 
within these conditions that create stress and restrict options that lead to individuals 
making what health professionals can judge as unhealthy and risky choices. To 
provide an illustrative, albeit linear and simplistic, example, the subjugating social 
norms against people from lower socio-economic backgrounds is influential in UK 
conservative economic policy such as to minimise state welfare support which 
perpetuates unequal financial opportunities, itself leading to SDH such as poor social 
housing, poor education and food insecurity. The experience of this is inherently 
stressful and restricts options to, for example, ways to relieve stress. This may lead 
to individuals making unhealthy decisions that quickly and temporarily relieve stress, 
such as to smoke, because healthier, longer term options are not easily accessible 
within an individual’s material constraints. Currently, public health intervention and 
campaigns target these downstream health-related decisions (Smith et al., 2015). 
 
Due to the overarching influence of ideologies constructed into public policy and 
social norms, health inequalities are recognised to be actively produced by society 
and therefore unjust and avoidable (Whitehead, 2007). Using judgemental 
rationalism, I believe it ethical to privilege these structural conceptualisations that 
understand individuals within their complex contextual position, over more simplistic 
individualised understandings which blame individuals, contributing to shame and 
stigma and so are harmful (Smith, 2013). The SDH does not claim that a ‘healthy’ 
society would be one in which physical illness or mental distress would be 
eradicated, but rather that a ‘healthy’ society would be an equal society, in that the 
distribution of mental and physical health problems would equally affect all social 
groups (L’Hôte et al., 2018). It is argued that this cannot be achieved through 
individual, reactive treatment of mental health problems (Albee, 1999).  
 
1.2.5 Epidemiological Underpinnings  
The population level epidemiological research that forms the majority of the evidence 
base for the SDH indicates that particular groups are more likely to face poorer 
health outcomes because of the unequal distribution of opportunities afforded to 
them. In the UK context, these groups include minority ethnic communities, disabled 
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communities, those with minority sexual orientation and gender identities and those 
from deprived socio-economic backgrounds (L’Hôte et al., 2018). The contribution of 
being able to map structural inequality at a societal level is clearly valuable 
contribution, offering an important starting point, however there are also significant 
limitations to epidemiological research. It is based on the assumption of a positivist 
epistemology despite the lack of explicit naming or reflexivity regarding this 
(Raphael, 2006). Positivism incorporates realist ontology and epistemology, meaning 
that all things that can be known must be directly observed (Pilgrim, 2017). This 
therefore aligns with an interpretation of reality that is static and individualistic, 
because complex structures and the values embedded within them and enacted by 
them are arguably not directly observable. Accordingly, this acknowledgment of 
‘social’ in the SDH theorising does not mitigate that this understanding is still based 
on research that assumes linear causal mechanisms between structural factors and 
an individual’s health (Josewski, 2017). Arguably then, attempting to understand the 
SDH through this paradigm alone surmounts to nothing more than reducing mental 
health inequalities to internal properties of individual minds (Bolam et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, in order to identify these widescale trends individuals are reduced to 
quantifiable categories, which does not afford rich, nuanced understandings upon 
which a complex preventative measure could be designed. These qualitative 
methodologies have typically been marginalised in mainstream PMH research 
(Rose-Clarke, 2020). Psychiatry and psychology have traditionally reinforced these 
individualised understandings and interventions of mental health outcomes and have 
been late in contributing to PMH and population level understandings (Orford, 2008). 
Psychologists are well placed to contribute more in-depth, qualitative research 
regarding the complex lived experience of multiple SDH. In order to develop 
appropriate, acceptable and effective prevention of the health inequalities 
experienced by particular groups, we need to be able to identify and integrate the 
multiple different ways of understanding the SDH and health inequalities (Josewski, 
2017).   
 
1.2.6 Social Locations  
When using qualitative data, we have the space to afford complexity to the 
categories used to group people in large scale epidemiological research. It is from 
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this position that we can begin to deconstruct the implicit conceptualisation of health 
as an individual phenomenon through drawing attention to society’s role in the 
creation and sustenance of structural inequality (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). 
Throughout this thesis I attempt to do this by referring to the social groups that 
experience health inequalities as ‘social locations’. This is to clarify that I am not 
referring to an internal characteristic belonging to, or on control of, the individual, but 
rather the active structural minoritisation of groups through a process of restricting 
access to resources, so are representative of actual power differentials and can be 
used to reflect those experiencing injustice (Roberts, 2009). Categorises are 
constructed by those with power, and therefore the norm is assumed from a place of 
privilege, which in the UK is presently characterised by ideologies of Whiteness, 
Maleness, Heteronormativity and non-disability (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). 
Those outside of these norms experience the unequal distribution of opportunity and 
resources (Compton & Shim, 2015), as explained in section 1.2.4. The term location 
reflects that these categories do not represent distinct groups but are spectrums in 
which an individual can be positioned in a more or less powerful location (Crenshaw, 
2006). Diversity is situated in the margins of society, with homogeneity at centre, 
meaning that those minoritised individuals have the ‘widest view’ of society, arguably 
meaning they are best situated to understand society as a whole and its fundamental 
truths (Afuape & Hughes, 2015). This wide understanding is necessary to 
conceptualise and prevent the health inequalities ultimately caused by public policy 
and social norms (Compton & Shim, 2015) and design PMH interventions 
appropriate for the whole population.  
 
1.2.7 The Different Constructions of ‘Disability’ 
The language I use at different times denotes different conceptualisations of 
disability, of which I intend to address and explain here. When I am discussing the 
findings of mainstream research, such as throughout the introduction, I am using 
what I believe is the same definition as this literature. Namely, utilising a realist 
epistemology and referring to a diagnostic construct, with ‘disability’ therefore being 
a medical or psychiatric condition that an individual does or does not have. My 
personal conceptualisation of disability, referred to mainly throughout the method 
and the critical review and recommendations parts of the discussion chapter, is that 
of a social location (as above in 1.2.6). I conceptualise this location as socially 
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constructed, in the sense of some ways of being as being constructed as 
problematically outside the norm, for example, having a learning disability or 
hyperactivity been framed as a deficit rather than a different way of being. Within this 
construct I believe are multiple, overlapping spectrums as opposed to categories. 
These include severity, visibility, support needs and impact on daily life. Different 
participants within their interviews appear to use disability to dente different 
meanings. When I am referring to a specific participants definition, mainly during the 
results chapter, I have attempted to reflect the meaning I have interpreted them to 
have used. These different conceptualisations are also therefore interweaved 
throughout the discussion chapter at points where I refer to participants 
constructions. When referring to the disabled community, I intend to reflect all those 
who would classify themselves as disabled, by whatever definition they choose. 
Understandably, these different conceptualisations all being utilised may lead to 
confusion on behalf of the reader, as adding this complexity certainly did for myself. I 
believe it is important to attempt to hold and work with this complexity, as different 
disciplines relevant to PMH will all hold different conceptualisations within 
themselves. I believe our debates cannot be complex enough if we reduce disability 
to only a limited portion of its meanings. 
 
1.2.8 The Relationship Between the Social Determinants, Social Policy and Ideology  
As explained in section 1.2.4, the literature regarding the SDH often examines social 
factors at the population level, assuming that a combination of social factors lead to 
mental health problems (WHO, 2014) implying a rather linear causal model, such as 
outlined in 1.2.4. However, this linearity is overly reductionist. It has been argued that 
social policy itself can worsen social factors, such as poverty and racism, rather than 
simply reflecting the norms valued by society (Cairney, 2019; Hankivsky & 
Christoffersen, 2008). It can be argued that many of the social policies with these 
negative consequences to social factors are neoliberal in nature. This is an 
economic framework that prioritises market deregulation, individual responsibility and 
a corresponding reduction of state support (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008; 
Mackenzie et al., 2017).  
 
It is important to consider the political nature of the process of structural 
minoritisation addressed in 1.2.6. This is because the process of upholding these 
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inequalities through policymaking is intensely ideological, enacted by those in power 
in ways that consolidate their power (Roberts, 2009; Stevens, 2011). This process, 
however, is not through individuals and their intentional actions but rather that 
systems are designed in such a way that the default position is to maintain the status 
quo (Cairney, 2019). We therefore need to name the systems in which PMH is 
situated and enacted in order to understand the unequal relationships of power that 
serve to uphold privilege to certain groups and subjugate others. Neoliberal ideology 
in the UK can be seen enacted in the policy. This sets a stage for a 
conceptualisation of justice based upon individual meritocracy, independence and 
competition (Mackenzie et al., 2017). This is because essentially the individual is 
seen as solely responsible for their own circumstances, and it is therefore hard work, 
will, strength of character or other internal characteristics that, through lifestyle 
choices rather than access to resources, shape the individual’s environment (Smith, 
2013). Health inequalities then, are seen as the responsibility and fault of the 
individual, rather than systems, which impacts how we conceptualise and attempt to 
produce a just society (Josewitz, 2017). This ideology serves to protect 
discriminatory systems from critique, and so does not align neatly with an SDH 
perspective through obscuring conceptual frameworks that would enable disruption 
of this dominant hegemony. 
 
It can be argued that neoliberalism shapes the public policies and social norms that 
lead to SDH and health inequalities. For example, the neoliberal moral preference 
towards efficiency and hard work is a social norm that devalues less economically 
productive individuals, for example those with disabilities, which then creates an 
inequality in opportunity, or structural barrier, for individuals diagnoses as disabled to 
access employment (Josewski, 2017). This SDH has a financial and psychological 
impact (Mcgrath et al., 2016).   
 
Research into the SDH are carried out within this wider context of neoliberalism and 
researchers have identified the significant impact this has upon their work. Smith 
(2013) interviewed public health researchers and found that whilst they were 
personally critical of government policies, such as ‘austerity’ policies seeking to 
reduce government spending on the public sector and welfare, due to the negative 
public health impact, they felt unable to be so professionally. This was because their 
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career was dependent upon receiving funding for their proposed research, which 
comes from the powerful institutions who benefit from neoliberal ideology. Clearly 
and concerningly then, structures with power and financial resources can shape the 
knowledge that is generated and therefore influence our understanding about health 
inequalities, and this process occurs within the systems that prioritise the 
individualisation of these inequalities through the focus on individual determination to 
choose a healthy lifestyle (Cairney, 2019; Smith, 2013). 
 
An example of this is the way in which public health interventions focus on individual 
responsibility to engage in healthy behaviours and lifestyle choices (Mackenzie et al., 
2017), such as the Every Mind Matters campaign (Public Health England [PHE], 
2019). These interventions further consolidate neoliberal ideology amongst the 
public through the representation of state sanctioned discourse of individualised 
mental health. These are continually implemented in spite of growing recognition that 
these individualist interventions actually widen health inequalities, through having a 
greater financial impact on poorer communities and increasing stigma and thus 
discrimination by shaming people for their poor mental health outcomes (Smith, 
2013). This gap between research and policy has been referred to as ‘behaviour and 
lifestyle drift’ (Mackenzie et al., 2017). Ethnographic research has identified that 
policymakers actively subjugate research regarding social inequalities (Stevens, 
2011), as this understanding leads to interventions that do not neatly fit with 
neoliberal systems that perpetuate these individualised understandings of health 
inequalities.  
 
Despite this, there are problems with only utilising the ideological framework of 
neoliberalism to consider the impact upon the SDH. Bell and Green (2016) critique 
the way in which neoliberalism is used in public health research, identifying that it is 
used in many different ways but researchers are rarely explicit about the ways in 
which they use this. They say that this leads to neoliberalism as an ideology being 
used monolithically, and with the implication that it itself is a causal force. Bell and 
Green (2016) advocate against reifying neoliberalism in this way, as it leads to an 
overly reductionist causal model of the SDH, ignoring many other important, 
contributing ideologies, such as Whiteness, Heteronormativity and the Patriarchy, all 
of which shape the SDH, inequality and access to resources in different ways. Bell 
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and Green (2016) suggest researchers reflect and clarify how they use 
neoliberalism, whilst calling for more specificity and nuance in accounts.  I would 
argue that one way in which this aim can be achieved would be to attend to 
intersectionality.  
 
1.2.9 Intersectionality  
Raphael (2006) argues that a critical perspective is necessary in order to incorporate 
and illuminate the multiple forces that influence the structure of society and shape 
the political, economic and social processes that in turn shape the SDH. An 
intersectional framework has been argued as perfectly situated to address this 
criticism of attending to just one ideological framework and incorporate the full extent 
of these macro-level structures and the power relations that uphold them (Bowleg, 
2012). Whereas the SDH frameworks points to moral concerns and practical 
solutions around the equitable distribution of downstream resources and 
opportunities, an intersectional lens looks further upstream, placing the primary 
ethical focus on the forces determining why resources have been unequally 
distributed in the first place, and how this disparity is maintained (Josewski, 2017). 
Arguably, policy change that may lead to more equitable opportunity distribution 
cannot be achieved or maintained without addressing this how and why.  
 
Intersectionality is an explanatory theoretical framework that aims to understand 
structural discrimination in all its multiple and overlapping complexity (Bowleg, 2012). 
Clearly, this can also be applied to understand the health inequalities particular 
groups face as identified by epidemiological data (Bowleg, 2012). It emphasises 
each social location is not seen as unidimensional, meaning that particular positions 
within each social location are not homogenous (Bowleg, 2012). It further highlights 
that social locations are not independent categories (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 
2008), we each occupy multiple social locations at any one time, and therefore are 
both simultaneously privileged and oppressed (Crenshaw, 2006). This means that 
any experience relating to a social location cannot be understood in isolation from 
others, for example, that gender cannot be related to mental health outcomes in the 
absence of also considering ethnicity, sexual orientation, socio-economic status etc.  
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Health inequalities are shown to be widening in the UK (Smith et al., 2015). This may 
be impacted by the fact that we do not fully understand the ways in which the 
determinants of health intersect and mutually reinforce each other (Hankivsky & 
Christoffersen, 2008). Most public health research that examines the SDH rarely 
incorporates an intersectional lens, instead examining at one oppressive social 
location individually (Bowleg, 2012). Specifically within the UK context socio-
economic status has been the focus, positioned as the ‘primary’ social determinant 
of health, in that it explains the causes of health inequalities above and beyond other 
social locations (Smith et al., 2015). This has been explicitly problematised because 
it draws focus away, as described above, from considering the active, political, 
stratification of society (Raphael, 2006), and does not consider social locations as 
heterogenous, for example that within a socio-economically deprived social 
locations, other marginalised social locations are more likely to then be situated 
within this, such as disabled and ethnic minority communities.  
 
It is widely acknowledged that to use an intersectional lens is to complicate matters 
(Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008), and that this has likely contributed to its lack of 
adoption within public health discourse more broadly and research specifically. 
Intersectionality highlights a plethora of different ideologies that influence the 
construction and reinforcement of social norms, public policy and therefore the SDH.  
intersectionality reminds us that at the individual level, these different aspects of 
identity and privilege intersect and influence each other in ways that are difficult to 
study within a linear social determinants perspective, in part as the privileged and 
subjugated positions are continuums rather than dichotomies. For example, the 
ideology of Whiteness privileges Western ideologies, the ideology of 
Heteronormativity privileges a nuclear construction of family, and a Patriarchal 
ideology privileges masculinity over femininity. While these are interrelated, they all 
shape social norms, social policy and SDH in different ways.     
 
I have found this complexity challenging to incorporate into every aspects of the 
research. Despite this, using public health aim to achieve a more just society, from a 
judgemental rationalism standpoint, we should endeavour to incorporate 
intersectionality despite this complexity. It should be appreciated that health 
inequalities result from alignment to multiple, intersecting discriminatory structures 
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(Bowleg, 2012). We need the focus on the most upstream determinants in order to 
intervene in the appropriate places, without locating blame or responsibility upon 
those situated within these oppressive structures. 
 
1.3 Public Understanding  
 
Public health is now dominated by an SDH understanding (Smith et al., 2015; WHO, 
2014) rather than individualised or intersectional. Still, there remains amongst 
professionals debate as to the public understanding regarding mental health, its 
causes, and mental health inequalities. The lived experience contribution is notably 
absent from this debate (Rose & McAuley, 2019; Smith et al., 2015). It is necessary 
to understand public opinion as it is within this context that public policies are 
advocated for and generated, and that social norms are enacted (Compton & Shim, 
2015; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). However, the debate often takes the form of 
whether the public understand what the SDH are and how they lead to health 
outcomes (Smith et al., 2017). There are ethical and pragmatic reasons as to why 
this simplified debate is problematic. Ethically, positioning non-professional 
understanding as non-expert, and considering whether the public ‘have’ the ‘correct’ 
understanding or not, devalues embodied and lived experiences and knowledge. 
This reinforces the elitism in the field, by positioning people without certain types of 
expert training as not possessing the right knowledge and therefore unable to 
contribute to the knowledge production (Smith, 2013). This paternalism is further 
reinforced through developing in a top-down manner applying inaccessible 
theoretical models to people, removing their agency to take control of factors 
influencing their health inequalities (Kagan et al., 2019). This directly contributes to 
Fricker’s (2007) epistemic injustice, whereby the public are assumed not to 
understand the SDH because of their lack of professional status, which constitutes 
testimonial injustice because their opinions are deemed less credible because of the 
‘lay’ categorisation. This then excludes the public from debates that develop 
understandings further, constituting hermeneutical injustice because the public are 
not afforded opportunities to learn the professional concepts necessary to contribute 
in these debates. Given this, public health has understandably been critiqued for 
being elitist, paternalistic and for its rare consideration of public viewpoints (Smith, 
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2013). There is a clear tension here as I will be drawing upon expert theoretical 
conceptualisations to make sense of my findings, which risks reproducing the power 
relations I have been critiquing. I will return to address this more fully in section 
4.5.2. Here, I will use judgemental rationalism to attempt to ameliorate this tension 
by privileging non-hegemonical qualitative literature that positions the public as 
experienced and embodied experiences in understanding health inequalities (Grace 
et al., 2008; Mackenzie et al., 2017) (see section 1.4.5).  
 
This debate also has pragmatic implications, through indicating how resources 
should allocated within PMH research, policy and intervention. For those who think 
the public do not understand the SDH and the way in which they cause to health 
inequalities, there are education campaigns (Smith & Anderson, 2018) and those 
focusing on an individual’s responsibility to change their behaviour (Garthwaite et al., 
2016). For those who believe the public do understand the SDH and how they lead 
to health inequalities, these campaigns are unnecessary and are thought to widen 
these inequalities (Smith, 2013). As well as causing this harm, these campaigns are 
ineffective in relation to reducing health damaging behaviours, because individuals 
have been shown to resist identification with a stigmatised role (Wilson et al., 2013) 
and therefore would not apply the information to themselves or change their 
behaviour as a result.  
 
1.4 Overview of Research into Public Conceptualisations of Mental Health   
 
As noted above, research into the SDH often uses ‘health’ to refer to both physical 
and mental health. Therefore, it is unclear whether the public conceptualises mental 
health differently to physical health, particularly in the context of the social 
determinants. 
 
1.4.1 Public Conceptualisation of what Constitutes ‘Mental Health’  
Mental health can be conceptualised in many different ways. The SDH as an 
explanatory causal framework does not posit what mental health actually is. For 
example, ‘mental health’ could correspond to experiences that reside in the 
individual body, brain or mind or alternatively this experience could reside 
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relationally, in the interface between individuals and others, or within the interface 
between individuals and power structures, replicating oppressive/privileged 
dynamics (Afuape & Hughes, 2015). Research methodology and epistemology 
impacts how mental health is constructed (Larsson, 2013) and the majority of 
research approaches it from an intrapsychic standpoint (Rapley, 2011).  
 
Quantitative psychological research has asked participants whether they would 
classify unusual or distressed behaviour, thoughts and feelings as ‘mental illness’. 
For example, Link et al., (1999) distributed a survey to 1444 members of the US 
public who were randomly allocated one of five vignettes, depicting symptoms of 
psychiatric diagnoses including Depression and Schizophrenia and a subclinical 
‘troubled person’. Participants conceptualised the first four vignettes as describing 
‘mental illnesses’, indicating a biomedical conceptualisation of mental health 
problems that is categorically different from ‘normal’ distress that the used to 
conceptualise the fifth vignette. This has changed substantially over time. Star 
(1955) conducted a survey with over 3000 members of the US public incorporating 
six vignettes of symptoms that corresponded to psychiatric diagnoses. Only one 
vignette, described to depict the symptoms of Paranoid Schizophrenia, was identified 
as a ‘mental illness’ by the majority of participants. This change is likely to be related 
to concerted efforts to promote illness understandings in Western countries in recent 
decades (Read et al., 2006), and that more funding has been given to studies 
exploring biology, partly because the profit-producing psychopharmological industry 
can afford to fund this and subsequently further profits from the findings, which are 
then published in high impact journals due to a more rigorous methodology and 
consequently regarded as the most established evidence-base (Lebowitz & 
Appelbaum, 2019).  
 
Qualitative research into health generally, rather than physical or mental specifically, 
has identified that is a complex concept, and that people struggle establishing what 
they believe it actually is before they can consider its causes (Blaxter, 1983; Glover 
et al., 2020). This research body similarly concludes the public predominantly 
conceptualise mental health as a biomedical phenomenon. L’Hôte et al (2018) 
interviewed 36 individuals who were described to be demographically representative 
of the UK population. Health was understood by the participants to constitute the 
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absence of illness and the presence of happiness, which itself was defined as the 
absence of problems. Structures that react to ill-health, both physically and mentally, 
were foregrounded (i.e. the NHS), which resulted in participants struggling to 
conceptualise what could prevent poor health. Health was attributed a clear moral 
dimension, in that good health was to be independent from direct reliance upon 
social or state support, which aligns with current neoliberal social norms and public 
policies.  
 
While these findings are helpful, neither psychological research into mental health or 
in-depth, SDH research into health generally with the public explicitly determines 
how mental health is conceptualised.  
 
1.4.2 Public Conceptualisation of the Causes of Mental Health  
Angermeyer and Dietrich (2006) conducted a review of research regarding the public 
causal beliefs of ‘mental illness’ from 1999-2004, incorporating 33 national and 29 
regional studies from America and Europe, and concluded that the public’s causal 
beliefs vary. L’Hôte et al (2018) summarise that the public hold a range of different 
understandings that are differentially drawn upon depending on context. As noted 
elsewhere, the dearth of literature regarding SDH (Parry et al., 2007) is reflected 
here, in that this literature does not include the SDH and so does not contribute to 
understandings of public perspectives regarding structural causes. The common 
causal beliefs and influencing factors illustrated in this research body will be outlined 
below.  
 
1.4.2.1 Common Causal Beliefs  
When presented vignettes denoting experiences that depicted symptoms in the 
diagnostic categories of Schizophrenia and Depression, in the absence of labelling 
these with the psychiatric diagnosis, the public identify primarily social causal factors, 
namely stress as the primary causal factor, and individual biological causes as the 
secondary (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Link et al., 1999). Link et al (1999) found 
that participants blended the psychosocial with biological factors. Bignall et al (2015) 
presented 34 participants in focus groups with 19 vignettes that correspond to 
symptoms of DSM psychiatric diagnoses. Using grounded theory, they identified 12 
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different casual beliefs used by participants. Overall, the most endorsed causal belief 
was individual characteristics such as laziness. This was followed by family (not 
elaborated further), normalisation (rather than pathologisation), spiritual and then 
biological causes.  
 
1.4.2.2 Impact of Diagnostic Label 
Whether a psychiatric diagnostic label is provided alongside or instead of the 
description of behaviours influences the causal beliefs the public draw upon to 
understand each mental health problem. Reviews have concluded that the majority 
of this research is conducted with the labels Schizophrenia and Depression 
(Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). This review identified that contradicting to when 
presented without the label, the presence of the diagnostic label of Schizophrenia 
lead to the public endorsing biological causal mechanisms as primary. For 
Depression however, psychosocial causes remained most endorsed when the label 
was introduced to the vignette. Pescosolido et al (2010) provided vignettes depicting 
symptoms of psychiatric labels to members of the public in 1996 and 2006. They 
identified that for Depression, in 1996 life stress was endorsed almost frequently as 
the causal belief, whereas in 2006 chemical imbalance became the most endorsed. 
For Schizophrenia, biological causal beliefs were the most endorsed at both points. 
Schoermus et al (2014) identified multiple causal beliefs were endorsed including 
biological, stress and childhood adversity for both Depression and Schizophrenia.  
 
1.4.2.3 Historical Socio-Cultural Context 
In their comparison study Pescosolido et al (2010) identified that overall, the publics 
endorsement of a biological cause increased over time, alongside the adoption of 
psychiatric labels to denote these experiences. Over this period, psychosocial and 
moral causal beliefs were found to decrease. Schomerus et al (2012) conducted a 
review of 16 studies globally that themselves conducted time trend analyses, 
collectively covering 16 years, and also conclude that the publics belief in biological 
causes of mental health problems increased by approximately 20%. However, they 
conclude that psychosocial beliefs, namely stress, remained at high levels and did 
not decrease for either Schizophrenia or Depression, suggesting that the public draw 
upon both biological and psychosocial causes for mental health problems.  
  
- 20 - 
 
 
1.4.2.4 Impact of Participants Social Locations  
Reviews of this research have found that participant socio-demographic 
characteristics influence which causal beliefs they draw upon (Angermeyer & 
Dietrich, 2006). Bignall et al., (2015) examine frequency of causal beliefs of 19 
vignettes in relation to participants ethnicity. They conclude that Hispanic participants 
endorse spiritual causal beliefs most, whereas Hispanic and Asian American 
participants were the most likely to normalise the vignettes. The white participants 
were the most likely to draw upon a history of trauma as a casual belief. Ventevogel 
et al (2013) similarly identified that culture influences how one conceptualises 
unusual, distressed and distressing thoughts, feelings and behaviours, and 
subsequently what causes these.  They conducted focus groups with participants 
they selected to be representative of their local communities in four different regions 
in three African countries (South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Burundi). They asked their participants to ‘talk about problems and illnesses that 
manifest through problems in thinking, feeling or behaving’. Participants did not use 
Western psychiatric diagnostic terminology to denote these experiences, but did 
classify certain groups of experiences thoughts, feelings and behaviours that differed 
from normal. The causal belief differed for each experience. All four regions 
endorsed what the authors call supernatural causes, including disturbed ancestral 
spirits, and natural causes, including psychoactive substances and infectious 
diseases, for experiences characterised by aggression, suspicion and/or talking 
nonsensically. Experiences characterised by sadness or social withdrawal were most 
commonly thought to be caused by psychosocial causes, such as bereavement, or 
structural causes, such as experiencing poverty.  
 
1.4.3 Methodological Limitations   
This research into the public’s causal beliefs of mental health problems indicates that 
multiple causal frameworks are drawn upon by different people in different contexts. 
These are influenced by the inclusion of a psychiatric diagnostic label and change 
according to time and place. The validity of these findings are strengthened as they 
take into account the social context of the individual depicted in vignettes, by 
changing gender, ethnicity and education level, and randomly allocating participants 
different vignettes (Bignall et al., 2015; Link et al., 1999; Ventevogel et al., 2013).  
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However, there are significant issues with this research that impacts the conclusions 
that can be drawn. This causal belief literature is not situated within a structural, 
macro-level conceptual framework, and I believe it is not fit for purpose to transpose 
from its original intention to PMH. This is largely due to methodological constraints. 
The majority of this research utilises questionnaires or surveys where participants 
are presented with statements and asked to rate agreement on a Likert scale. The 
statements on these are mostly predetermined by either the authors directly or 
indirectly through their selection of a standardised questionnaire (see Bignall et al., 
2015; Ventevogel et al., 2013 for notable exceptions). As these are often not framed 
from a structural standpoint, they do not include structural statements such as 
institutional discrimination, and so the public endorsement of structural causes such 
as SDH cannot be interpreted. Therefore, we cannot conclude that these are the 
only frameworks that the public use, or that the public would use these frameworks if 
asked openly, as they have been primed and constrained by the causal statements 
provided.  
 
These predetermined statements are reductionist, complex and distressing social, 
structural and relational factors are minimised statements such as ‘workplace stress’, 
‘traumatic experience’ and ‘adverse childhood experiences’ which can actually be 
understood to obscure an individual’s causal understanding. For example, 
‘workplace stress’ could be conceptualised from the dominant Stress-Vulnerability 
model (Harper et al., 2020; Zubin & Spring, 1977) whereby the experience of this 
personal adversity triggers an underlying, predisposed individual pathology, leading 
the development of a mental health condition. Alternatively, ‘workplace stress’ could 
also be understand from a structural causal lens, leading to difficulties 
conceptualised as relational that re-enact discriminatory institutions on the micro 
level (Afuape & Hughes, 2015). Thus, it is difficult to conclude from this research 
alone what conceptual frameworks the public are drawing upon, let alone what 
influences different frameworks being used at different points.   
 
Similarly, the studies that use psychiatric diagnostic labels to depict of unusual or 
distressed experiences, without space to deconstruct this, further restricts the 
conceptual frameworks that can be drawn upon. For example, as demonstrated 
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above, participants are more likely to attribute biological causal mechanisms when 
the label Schizophrenia is provided rather than a description of the associated 
unusual behaviours and thoughts (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). As argued, 
targeted campaigns have aimed to increase these association (Read, 2005). 
However, this contrived/arbitrary scenario may not reflect anything that relates to 
actual experience. For example, a participant who ascribes to the Muslim faith may 
conceptualise the unusual perceptual experiences that they may come across in 
daily life as Jinn possession and may never use the term Schizophrenia or biological 
causal mechanisms to make sense of this in a naturalistic setting but may select this 
when presented with a limited list of causal options.   
 
1.4.4 Epistemological Limitations  
The research appears to, uncritically and without reflection or acknowledgement, 
hold a realist ontological and epistemological position, thereby implicitly assuming 
the psychiatric conceptualisation of mental health represents a real, underlying entity 
existing within individuals that can be correctly identified (Bentall, 2004). This 
narrows and constraints the research, which can be understood as investigating 
whether the public understand or agree with the authors pre-existing assumptions, 
narrowing space for the public to share their own ideas spontaneously. Realist 
ontological positioning further reinforces elitist and expert models, through assessing 
whether the public have ‘mental health literacy’ which essentially means to 
conceptualise mental health to be a ‘disease like any other’ (Jorm, 2000). By 
positioning any conceptualisation that does not align with the psychiatric model as 
‘incorrect’, this may be contributing to testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007) through 
reinforcing the narrative that the ‘lay’ person, those without socialisation to the 
medical model through formal training, does not possess the correct knowledge. This 
serves to silence any alternative conceptualisations and so can only reinforce the 
psychiatric as correct. This is additionally problematised when using the label 
Schizophrenia from this realist position, which even amongst professionals who 
adhere to medicalising conceptual model of ‘psychosis’ is one of the most contested 
diagnoses, having been argued as invalid and unreliable as a categorisation (Boyle, 
1990). We cannot draw conclusions as to whether the public correctly understand 
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what a construct is and what causes it when this correct understanding is not agreed 
upon.   
 
1.4.5 How the Public Conceptualise the Causes of Health   
To address some of these issues, we can draw upon in-depth, qualitative, 
sociological literature that examines how the public understand the causes of health 
inequalities. In order to include this methodology, I had to widen my literature search 
to incorporate health generally, as majority of these studies refer to both physical 
and mental health. These studies therefore implicitly frame mental health from a 
psychiatric diagnostic standpoint. Whereas the above research is international, these 
studies are from a UK context and are explicitly conducted from an SDH lens, 
allowing space for a structural causal interpretation. This research similarly illustrates 
that the public draw upon multiple causal conceptual frameworks, albeit including 
structural.  
 
L’Hôte et al (2018) identified the public predominantly draw upon an individualistic 
understanding, which was conceptualised to include both psychosocial and 
biological factors. They utilised interview methodology and grounded theory to 
conclude that the individualistic conceptual framework comprised several main 
models. Health was mainly understood to be caused by lifestyle and behavioural 
choices made by the individual, which were determined due to individual discipline 
and willpower. This included mental health problems, in that with the right mindset 
people could be happy and so good mental health was conceptualised as the 
outward manifestation of strength of character. This indicates the moral dimension to 
health, as poor health and subsequent burdensome use of resources was 
understood as the result of an individual failing, in line with neoliberal ideology. Any 
exceptions that appeared to violate these assumptions were explained as a result of 
genetics or fate. Through their exploratory questions, L’Hôte et al (2018) conclude 
that the public also draw upon a structural causal conceptual framework. They 
identified that it was less often drawn upon, was more unstable in response to 
questioning and so utilised in a simplistic manner. For example, they interpret that 
while participants articulated how stress led to mental health outcomes, and that 
stress could be caused by structural inequalities such as poor housing, participants 
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would revert to an individualistic health narrative to conceptualise health promotion 
and prevention, in that individuals should simply remove themselves from stressful 
situations and otherwise will themselves to make healthier choices in order to 
become well. Discrimination was conceptualised by participants as a consequence 
of health inequalities, such as the stigma associated to being diagnosed with a 
psychiatric condition, rather than a cause.  
 
There are ethical implications these conclusions. Suggesting that the lay public do 
not have adequate understanding of the SDH, from the benchmark of a professional 
understanding, simultaneously serves to privilege the expert position as ‘correct’, 
and devalue the public knowledge, which contributes to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 
2007), as above described. Rather than a lack of knowledge, these findings may 
indicate that the public hold complex and multiple narratives to conceptualise the 
causes of health, and that certain social processes may have led to these 
participants privileging an individualistic health narrative at this time. Other qualitative 
research provides evidence for this premise. This research in the UK is typically 
carried out with people who experience socio-economic deprivation (Ridley et al., 
2020). There appear to be complex and nuanced processes occurring that constrain 
or facilitate the narratives that individuals draw upon to understand the causes of 
health inequalities. This research typically asks people who reside in a deprived area 
how living there impacts their health, or, presents participants with evidence of health 
inequalities, therefore providing a structural causal explanation, and asks them to 
discuss this (Smith & Anderson, 2018). These represent key differences from the 
psychological literature, by asking people about their own experience rather than 
hypothetical others, and presenting predetermined causal statements that are 
structural rather than individualised. Taken overall, this research body largely 
highlights the public’s understanding corresponds with academic understandings, 
that structural causes, such as unequal access to good quality housing and 
education, are mediated to health outcomes through interpersonal psychosocial 
processes, for example the impact of poverty leading to feelings of stress, fear, 
isolation, powerlessness, hopelessness and low self-esteem (Smith & Anderson, 
2018). These, in turn, impact upon behavioural and lifestyle choices, such as 
smoking and consuming alcohol at the end of a complex causal chain, through 
providing survival strategies such as short term de-stressing and escapism 
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(Davidson et al., 2006; Mackenzie et al., 2017). This complex causal 
conceptualisation is evident across multiple studies assessing ‘health’ generally 
(Backett-Milburn et al., 2003; Bolam et al., 2006; Cattell, 2001; Dolan, 2007a, 2007b; 
Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017a; Grace et al., 2008; MacDonald & Shildrick, 2013; 
Mackenzie et al., 2017; McGarrol, 2020; Morrow, 2000; Parry et al., 2007) and 
mental health problems specifically (Barnes et al., 2016; Mattheys et al., 2018; 
McDermott et al., 2018; Sah et al., 2019; Watson & Douglas, 2012).  
 
These findings conclude that there are also multiple influencing factors as to which 
causal frameworks the public draw upon at different times. One influencing factor I 
found notable was emotions. For example, some studies identified that when 
confronted with a health inequality they may experience, participants could deny a 
structural cause in favour for individualist explanations that foreground choice, which 
was concluded to this afford the individual control which may manage fatalistic 
anxiety (Airey, 2003; Backett-Milburn et al., 2006; Bolam et al., 2004; Macintyre et 
al., 2005; Peacock et al., 2014; Popay, et al., 2003). In other studies, individuals 
discussed structural causes in reference to hypothetical others from the same area 
rather than to themselves directly (Airey, 2003; Backett-Milburn et al., 2003; Bolam 
et al., 2004; Peacock et al., 2014; Popay et al., 2003). Peacock (2014) labels this 
process ‘othering’ and explains this allows the self to be positioned in the non-
judgemental, safe place of not experiencing an inevitable and fatalistic inequality, 
while also affording space to make sense of their own painful experiences that are 
safely projected onto the ‘other’. When confronted with health inequalities in focus 
groups, participants did discuss rather than deny structural causes (Davidson et al., 
2006, 2008; Hodgins et al., 2006; Parry et al., 2007; Rind & Jones, 2015). Whilst not 
highlighted directly by the authors themselves, I interpret this in the context of the 
other findings as collective solidarity that may act as partial protection against the 
strong, negative affect that Davidson et al (2006) note the participants displayed.  
  
In summary, research presents a complex picture as to how the public understand 
mental health, health inequalities and there causes, which appears related to the 
research methodology, epistemology and discipline (Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017; 
Mackenzie et al., 2017; Popay et al., 2003; Smith, 2017). Quantitative psychological 
research suggests the public conceptualise individualised spiritual, psychosocial and 
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biological causal factors and which they draw upon is dependent upon time, place 
and whether a health framework is introduced through the provision of psychiatric 
diagnostic labels. Qualitative sociological research suggests the public primarily 
utilise a structural understanding in line with the SDH when considering their own 
health, but that affective defences can detract focus to individualised causes which 
are in the individual’s control. However, both methodologies imply that participants 
may acquiesce to predetermined causal statements.  
 
1.4.6 Intersectional Critique  
This qualitative literature also has limitations. Namely, intersectionality and different 
social locations are overlooked, conclusions are drawn in relation to economically 
disadvantaged groups in the UK context or to the public generally which 
problematically centres privileged locations as the norm, by not explicitly reflecting 
whether participants conform to these norms and the impact of this. Therefore, the 
production of knowledge continues to be perpetuated from a White, Patriarchal, 
Heteronormative, non-disabled context in the UK (Cole, 2009; Hankivsky & 
Christoffersen, 2008). Disability particularly has been overlooked within research 
which largely does not address the disability status, in diagnostic terms, of the 
participants (Cole, 2009). L’Hôte et al (2018) is an example of this, recruiting a 
sample representative of the UK context but without mentioning disability status 
which should have constituted 20-25% of their sample in order to representative in 
this respect (DWP, 2018). Public health interventions that are researched on the 
general population are assumed to apply to people with impairments (Berghs et al., 
2016). This represents a historical pattern of structural violence whereby disabled 
individuals are silenced and treated as an afterthought, for example as seen that 
there has been a limited literature that incorporates both public health and disability 
rights frameworks (Berghs et al., 2016). The above research then inadvertently 
replicates the dynamics of the structural oppression through the silencing of disabled 
voices.  
 
1.4.7 Disabled Social Location  
The above could be argued for many different subjugated groups. It was during the 
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic that I had to re-design the research. I wanted 
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to be aware of how the pandemic and public health responses were impacting health 
and social inequalities and so spent time researching this. The significant 
exacerbation of inequalities faced by the disabled community as a combined result of 
both the necessity to ‘shield’ and the disproportionate impact of public health 
responses (Sisters of Frida, 2020; ONS, 2021) disturbed me and led to deep 
reflections on my own internalised ableism and subsequent role in upholding these 
narratives in seemingly innocuous, everyday interactions (Afuape, 2011). Further 
investigations highlighted there is a dearth of public health literature that focuses on 
the experience of disabled individuals (Berghs et al., 2016), and what is available 
discusses the unequal impact of structural interventions, such as welfare cuts (Duffy, 
2013). Hence, I decided privilege the lived expertise of disabled members of the 
general public in this research. All members of the general public are situated within 
multiple intersecting social locations. While not the focal point of this research, I aim 
to normalise research with the general public that highlights without focusing 
primarily upon marginalised social locations they may be positioned upon. It is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this research to fully examine the how structural 
discrimination impacts people with disabilities and their lived experience. This is a 
powerful, important and moving body of literature. However, in the aim of normalising 
disabled people as ‘members of the general public’, this is seen as justifiable.  
 
In the SDH literature, disability, here the presence of a diagnosis, is conceptualised 
as both a health inequality and a cause of health inequalities (L’Hôte et al., 2018). I 
have conceptualised disability as a social location here (Oliver, 1983), a group that 
experience health inequalities. This conceptualisation is in line with a critical realist 
epistemology and originates from a social model conceptualisation. These 
frameworks distinguish the notion of ‘disability’ from that of ‘impairment’. An 
impairment refers to an organic problem or functional limitation of a body, but the 
‘problem’ is situated as within a society that dis-ables people through restricting their 
ability to function within a normal range due to social barriers (Oliver, 1983; WHO, 
2011). This distinction is made so that these biological and social difficulties can be 
disentangled and approached separately (Josewski, 2017). I therefore use this term 
as a social location to understand that individuals with physical impairments are 
structurally marginalised through the processes outlined in section 1.2.4, and that it 
is this process that leads to the additional health inequalities faced by the disabled 
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community. In line with intersectionality, I am not conceptualising disability as a 
binary category in which one is either disabled or abled, but rather than this 
represents a spectrum of power and privilege (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). 
 
1.5 Summary of Research Justification 
 
I have outlined some of the limitations to existing research, of which I aim to address 
here. All of us live mental health, we all have expert knowledge on the subject, 
contrary to professional colonisation. There is a call for research that assesses the 
public causal beliefs of mental health difficulties specifically, rather than health 
generally, utilising a methodology that allows for open ended exploration (Hinshaw & 
Stier, 2008), which is lacking in current literature. This methodology can create 
space for a live understanding of multiple causal frameworks that each individual 
may use to understand mental health, alongside using psychological understandings 
of process to consider what may influence different conceptualisations being drawn 
upon at different times. I will both allow space for participants to spontaneously bring 
and explore different conceptual frameworks in the absence of predetermined 
statements to explore what is drawn upon initially and naturally, as in L’Hôte et al., 
2018). I will then provide predetermined causal frameworks in order to provide 
adequate opportunity to demonstrate their opinions, ensuring I do not conclude 
individuals do not possess knowledge that they have not been provided adequate 
opportunity to consider without constraint.  
 
I did not want to replicate exclusionary research that reifies white, heteronormative, 
patriarchal, non-disabled hegemonical understandings, as I aim to use the power 
afforded to me through my professional training and status to disrupt these 
hegemonical systems. There is a dearth of public health research that utilises the 
perspectives of the disabled community (Berghs et al., 2016), a group who have 
experienced sharply exacerbated health inequalities as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the public health responses to this (Sisters of Frida, 2020; ONS, 
2021). Diversity is situated at the margins of society, with homogeneity at the centre, 
meaning minoritised individuals have the ‘widest view’ of society and are therefore 
best situated to understand society as a whole (Afuape, 2020). Given the unequal 
  
- 29 - 
 
impact of the pandemic, I believe it is a key moment in history to listen to the 
expertise of the marginalised disabled community to progress PHM because, as we 
have seen, inventions designed solely by professionals can be problematic (Sisters 
of Frida, 2020). It is only through liberation of the most marginalised that we can 
liberate everyone (Kagan et al., 2019), a philosophy that applies well to public health 
interventions. 
 
1.6 Research Question 
 
The study aims to explore how disabled adults in the UK understand mental health 
and it’s causes alongside what processes influence which causal frameworks are 
utilised at different points. The main research question is:  
 
how do disabled members of the general public understand mental health, 
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2.0 METHODOLOGY   
  
  
This chapter outlines the construction and position of the research, along with the 
procedures utilised.   
  
2.1 Epistemological Approach  
  
As defined in section 1.1.1 ontological realism allows me to approach the data from 
the assumption that there is a material reality and the participants’ talk 
reflects this (Pilgrim, 2017). I explicitly position myself as actively constructing 
the research conceptualisation, design and analysis, so that I own how my 
assumptions and social position interact with the research process (Malterud, 2001), 
and will be modest about any claims made. There is the risk that I could analyse the 
findings inconsistently through selective relativism, meaning to choose to question 
some claims whilst ignoring others (Harper, 2004) which could perpetuate 
oppressive ideologies by negating to critically appraise them and therefore 
presenting them as factual. I have attempted to manage this conflict through 
positioning ‘real’ and constructed’ neither as a mutually exclusive dichotomy or as 
homogenous categories (Burr, 2002), but that both material reality and the influence 
of power structures can simultaneously constrain and facilitate participants 
understanding of mental health and its causes. This dual emphasis that incorporates 
an explicit critique of the awareness of how political power relations and structures 
maintain and constrain different forms of understanding allows space to disrupt these 
systems (Sullivan & Forrester, 2018). For this purpose, the political context has been 
explicitly introduced in section 1.2.7.  As in section 1.1.1, I am using judgement 
rationalism to justify privileging the interpretations that allow space for subverting 
oppressive discourses as I believe this best meets the PMH aim of social justice.    
  
I selected Thematic Analysis (TA) as it has no embedded theoretical or 
epistemological alignment and so can be utilised from a CR position. I utilised Braun 
and Clarke’s (2006) TA conceptualisation, detailed in section 2.3.6. This can allow 
explicit consideration of the constructed politicised as well as lived reality of social 
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locations and mental health to be explored. I have utilised an inductive approach in 
attempt to identify freely the conceptual frameworks the participants use, rather than 
through the lens of particular professional-guiding theories or frameworks such as 
the SDH. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis and Narrative Analysis may 
have addressed the research question, however on balance I decided neither 
allowed enough upon material reality than is appropriate for subjugated groups or 
the experience of health inequality (Willig & Rogers, 2017). Grounded Theory could 
also be considered an appropriate method to address my research 
question, however, when attempting to utilise an intersectional lens, the generation 
of a model is not the most appropriate aim.   
  
2.2 Intersectionality in Research  
  
There is a dearth of guidelines regarding incorporating intersectionality into 
research (Bowleg, 2012; Smith et al., 2015).  Intersectionality rejects the assumption 
of homogeneity of categories, instead positioning them as fluid, heterogenous 
and because we all occupy multiple simultaneously, inappropriate to separate 
and analyse independently (Bowleg, 2012). Understandably, this poses challenges 
when combining with methods that assume within category homogeneity. I therefore 
had to manage the conflict of conducting good quality TA whilst ensuring I do not 
assume these individuals, positioned upon the social location of 
disability, represent a normative experience (Cole, 2009). One way that has been 
suggested to manage this is to seek and value maximum variation across 
participants, in relation to other social locations, in order to incorporate 
intersectionality’s assumption of heterogeneity within categories (Dean et al., 
2017). Fortunately, this was able to be achieved with the current sample, 
representing diversity across social locations such as age, gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality and geographical location. Through positioning the social location of 
disability as a gradient and not a binary (Smith et al., 2015), large within category 
variation was also achieved through diversity of conditions, including visible 
and invisible disabilities, a spectrum of severity including life-limiting conditions, daily 
support needs and independently manageable conditions, physical and mental 
diagnoses (see table one).  
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Relativist epistemologies assumes ‘language’ to denote a form of social action 
through which reality is constructed in interactions, and therefore is used as a tool to 
deconstruct reified concepts (Pilgrim, 2019). The act of naming can be understood 
as violent in itself, through reifying a category which involves imposing a hierarchy, 
identifying an ‘other’, and restricting available constructions of lived experience 
through creating the binary of being assigned to the group or not (Spivak & Derrida, 
1998). Uncritically applying well-established binary categories to classify participants 
and to interpret their experience fails to challenge structural and interpersonal power 
dynamics (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). When considering how best to 
incorporate intersectionality, I considered whether to recruit a specific intersection of 
multiple social locations as has been suggested elsewhere (Bowleg, 2012; Quinn et 
al., 2019). However, mindful of the oppression that binary categories can impose, I 
decided to constrain inclusion criteria to the one social location of disability.   
  
Public health researchers have been called to incorporate intersectionality into their 
analysis to better understand the complex, cumulative and converging 
experiences that shape health (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). They 
recommend doing this by continually asking “who has power and control over whom 
in this interaction?”, which I have incorporated into the both the semantic (what the 
participants explicitly communicated) and latent (ideologies and assumptions 
underlying the participants speech) levels of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). To 
answer these required I continually reflect upon my own ‘institutionalised cultural 
patterns of interpretation and evaluation’ to attempt to minimise the influence of my 
own assumptions, which have the risk of actively subjugating through exploitative 
and tokenistic use of participants talk (Khanom et al., 2015). See Appendix A as an 
example extract from my reflexive accounts.   
  
2.3 Method   
  
2.3.1 Ethical Considerations  
Ethical approval was received from the UEL Ethics Committee (Appendix B). Multiple 
complex ethical issues arose in the consideration of conducting research with a 
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marginalised community of which I am not a part of. These are explored in-
depth in section 4.5.2.  Participants confidentiality was protected by anonymising 
transcripts through removing identifiable information included names, places and 
institutions, and allocating pseudonyms. The risk of conducting online interviews was 
managed using an encrypted, university approval software, Microsoft Teams. Risk 
was managed through asking participants abstract and general questions rather than 
about their personal experiences or mental health, allowing participants the non-
coerced option as to whether to disclose. Further support resources where included 
in the Debrief Letter to manage risk (Appendix C). 
  
2.3.2 Data Collection   
I utilised semi-structured interviews due to the balance of targeted 
questioning, flexible follow-up and in-depth exploration. This ensured I could 
consider participants spontaneous causal frameworks, processes influencing the 
negotiation of multiple frameworks, alongside ensuring the structured opportunity to 
discuss all the causes arose from my literature search. Focus groups may have been 
appropriate to address the research question. However, given that some areas of the 
disabled community are small, for example online communities of those with rarer 
conditions, I felt this might risk participants confidentiality and potentially restrict what 
they felt comfortable to share. I produced an interview schedule following the early 
literature reviews and discussions in supervision (Appendix D). Inevitability, my skill, 
refinement and focus with follow-up questions developed as the interviews 
progressed, particularly in relation to the complex, abstract conceptual questioning. I 
decided not to complete a pilot interview with a participant who identified as disabled, 
given the time constraints imposed by the pandemic and changing topic, and 
possibility that recruitment could take substantial time. I instead piloted 
the interview with friends and colleagues as practice to refine my questioning.   
  
Microsoft Teams software has a function that transcribes recorded meetings. These 
transcripts were saved to my confidential, password-protected University Microsoft 
account, downloaded through a VTT cleaner and opened using Microsoft Word. I 
then checked the transcription against the recordings to ensure accuracy. I added 
punctuation to increase readability and to attempt to represent participants talk as I 
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heard it. Recordings will be erased when the thesis has been completed and 
examined. Transcripts will be stored on a private, password-protected computer and 
will be erased after 5 years. My supervisor and the researcher examiners can 
request access to the anonymised transcriptions.   
  
2.3.3 Recruitment   
A flyer was developed to advertise the research, identifying the inclusion criteria. The 
first criteria was for those who identify as disabled. This request for self-
identification had two reasons; that it would not be necessary to 
‘evidence’ one’s disability, for example through receipt of any related benefits, 
and as my write up would position participants as disabled it was vital to 
ensure participants were comfortable being labelled as such. This aimed to minimise 
the harm of imposing violent binaries within the researcher-participant 
relationship. The broad inclusion criteria of ‘disability’ was selected in line with 
the United Nations Convention for the Rights of People with Disabilities, this meant 
that individuals with both physical and mental health diagnoses participated. I 
allowed for this in order to prevention imposing my personal conceptual framework of 
mental health upon participants. The second inclusion criteria was for adults residing 
in the UK. The age was to minimise risk as children are considered vulnerable and 
the topic is potentially distressing, and UK residence for some homogeneity of socio-
political context. The final inclusion criteria was for participants to be members of 
the general public rather than health-allied professionals, which I established upon 
screening.   
  
Eight to twelve participants is suggested as the minimum required to reach 
theoretical saturation in qualitative analysis (Guest et al., 2006). A range of 
recruitment strategies were adopted to ensure this was possible, particularly given 
that I am not personally connected to the disabled community. The flyer was 
disseminated through the social media platforms Twitter and Instagram using 
hashtags linked to the disabled community and PMH. I contacted three national third 
sector organisations and requested they disseminate to their mailing lists, two 
of kindly supported with this. Finally, I contacted non-health, Non-Governmental 
Organisations that friends are employed by and disseminated through their 
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employee disability networks. At least one participant was recruited through 
each outlet.   
  
2.3.4 Procedure  
The disseminated flyer invited interested individuals to contact me for further 
information. Everyone that contacted me to inquire about the research was sent an 
Information Sheet (Appendix E). Once participants had consented to participate and 
I had established whether they met inclusion criteria, they were emailed 
a Consent Form (Appendix F). Interviews were held virtually using Microsoft Teams. 
I conducted all interviews from my home in a quiet, private room. All interviews were 
recorded on Microsoft Teams, for which consent was gained at the beginning. I 
offered participants a space to ask questions about the research and put into place 
some accessibility needs (for example, turning off cameras, arranging a time point at 
which cease, one interview took place over 2 30-minute sessions for this purpose). 
The total duration of each interviews was between 66 and 123 minutes. Following 
the interviews, participants were emailed debrief information, a gift voucher 
and a voucher claim form.   
  
2.3.5 Participants   
Ten individuals participated, their self-defined demographics are summarised 
in Table One. As illustrated, the participants represent diversity across multiple social 
locations. The participants ages ranged from 22-74. Five participants identified as 
female, three as non-binary and two as male. Five participants were in paid 
employment at the time of their interview, five were not. All participants had received 
physical health diagnosis. Six participants also shared lived experience of mental 
distress or mental health conditions. Participants represented a range of ethnicities. 
Five participants identified as White British, one as White European. One participant 
identified as Pakistani, one as Chinese, one as British Asian and one as Arab mixed 
race.   
  
Table 1  
  
Participant demographics   
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 Muscle Wasting Disease  




to long term 
health 
condition  
Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME)  





race   
Full time 
student  
Disability/learning difficulty and 
mental health  





Sensory disability and mental 
distress  





Cerebral Palsy   
Liena  26  Female  Chinese  
Student and 
in receipt of 
disability 
benefits  
Physical and previous mental 
health diagnosis  






Irritable Bowel Syndrome 
and Borderline Personality 
Disorder  





Long term physical and mental 
health conditions   




and student  
Life-limiting genetic syndrome  
Zahir  43  Male  Pakistani  
Full time 
carer  
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2.3.6 Data Analysis  
Analysis of the ten interviews followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six step 
approach, highlighted below.  
  
a) Familiarisation with the data. I checked the transcripts back to the 
recording to make corrections which required close examination of 
each interview. During this phase I kept a reflective log of themes and 
issues that stood out to me non-systematically. This was helpful to 
highlight my own biases, including my initial privileged of oppressive 
causes over health-related processes.  
  
b) Generating initial codes. I initially read the transcripts, summarising the 
smallest units of meaning. In line with inductive analysis, these codes were 
closely linked to the content of the text.   
  
c) Searching for initial themes. I began with organising the codes into 
meaningful groups within and across transcripts. This process allowed 
the condensing of codes. I then returned to the transcripts in 
NVIVO software with the reduced codes to allow more efficient re-
organisation. I also utilised various colour coded maps using post-it notes 
to allow visual conceptualisation and experimental reorganisation of the 
themes and subthemes (Appendix G).   
  
d)  Reviewing themes. I then revised the themes in order to check that they 
were appropriately distinct and internally consistent (Patton, 1990), which 
involved merging of themes and the generation of subthemes.   
  
e) Defining and naming themes. I defined the themes ensuring the broad 
categories could be succulently summarised and that each was 
representative of the whole data set.  This is an iterative rather than a 
staged process and I cycled through the steps multiple times in order 
to refine the themes.   
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f) Producing the report. I attempted to select key extracts that were fairly 
distributed across participants and that demonstrated the narrative of the 
findings within and across themes.    
  
2.3.7 Evaluative Criteria  
In line with Braun and Clarke (2006)’s guidelines for good quality research, I 
engaged in personal and epistemological reflexivity throughout the research 
process. Consideration of my own social locations and the impact on the participants 
and research process is addressed in section 4.5.2 and Appendix A. I will return to 
appraise the quality of the research in section 4.5.4 utilising Spencer and 
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3.0 ANALYSIS  
  
  
3.1 Introduction and Overview   
  
This section presents the constructed themes. Table Two outlines the 
four superordinate themes and corresponding subthemes. Whilst I have actively 
constructed the themes and therefore my own assumptions are deeply embedded, I 
have attempted to ground these in the participants own words and have utilised 
extracts from their interviews to illustrate how I interpreted how they made sense of 
mental health. This will be explored in more depth in chapter 4.   
  
The first theme focuses on the process of utilising health language, how this 
influenced the participants conceptual models drawn upon. The second theme 
incorporates the ways the participants made sense of experiences that indicated a 
problem in comparison to ‘normal’ distressing experiences. The third theme includes 
the process of critical exploration of categorising, both into psychiatric diagnoses and 
into social locations. The final theme explores the multiple and complex causal 
explanations the participants drew upon. A key for the presentation of extracts can 
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Superordinate Theme  Subordinate Themes  
“’Mental Health’ Makes You Think 
Medical”  
  
“When Does a Normal Condition Become 
an Illness?”: Social Norm Violation  
“Walking on Dangerous Ground”: The 
Impact of Categorising  
"The Labels Helped”  
Criticisms   
The Dangers of Questioning: “Not Being 
Heard”  
Causal Explanations  
Explanations for Everyone  
Embodied Explanations  
Oppressive Impact of Social Norms   
Institutional Explanations  
  
3.2 Theme 1 – “’Mental Health’ Makes You Think Medical”   
  
This theme explores the process initiated through the terminology ‘mental 
health’ to introducing the interview. Eight participants are included in this theme, 
which incorporates both an implicit utilising of health frameworks and an explicit, 
critical analysis of the assumptions underlying this term. Four participants primarily 
used this framework implicitly, drawing upon assumptions as facts. One 
participant entirely discussed health frameworks explicitly, naming the taken-for-
granted assumptions. Three participants drew upon health frameworks both 
implicitly and explicitly. These participants initially illustrated taken-for-granting 
thinking which progressed to an explicit analysis as the interview proceeded. I 
have constructed these variations under one overarching theme to demonstrate this 
overlap is normal because the everyday available language used to understand 
emotional wellbeing and distress utilises a health framework (L’Hôte et al., 2018; 
Link et al., 1999).  
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The below extract represents conceptualisation using a taken-for-
granted health assumption. With the example of a broken leg, it is implicitly thought 
as fact that internal damage exists that can be made visible through medical 
scans that a medical professional can interpret. Without explicitly naming this, 
Misha is drawing upon the same framework to understand mental health. She 
appears to conceptualise low mood as originating internally, that could similarly be 
evidenced through a specialist scan. The conceptual model that mental health is akin 
to physical health, caused by internal, biological, deficit is treated here as fact.   
  
There is a frustration as well like with physical health, you go to the doctor if 
you’ve broken your leg, you can see it, we don't all have access to MRI scans 
when we're feeling crap, to be able to have that scan to then show a doctor 
“Look, I am down”. (Misha)   
  
Of the four participants who drew upon the health model implicitly, doing so 
appeared to restrict the resources available to reason and explore mental 
health conceptually. This is likely because the assumptions are so deeply taken-for 
granted that they are held unquestionably as fact which is therefore difficult 
to identify within oneself. One such example was that distressing or unusual 
experiences are illnesses which are made up of symptoms, an assumption that 
participants used to delineate psychiatric diagnoses from non-diagnostic experiences 
of distress. Below, Jamie represents a culturally prevailing example, whereby the 
identification of a physiological processes in association with mental health 
and its embodied experience is implicitly assumed to be both its cause and 
constitution. 
  
I think where there is just this like much more physical feeling of something 
about it [Borderline Personality Disorder]. I self-medicated with abusing 
substances in the past that has helped my symptoms go away, so maybe there 
would be a medication out there that like does the same thing but in a 
better way[…] Which makes me feel like it is a bit more of this like physical 
thing as well, I think with mental health it is, I think no matter what you have, I 
think it is always physiological though. (Jamie)  
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Four participants were conscious the language of health restricted their thinking to 
notions of illnesses, problems and reactive treatments, whilst other terminology, such 
as “wellbeing”, is conceptualised more straightforwardly as different to psychiatric 
health.     
  
‘Mental health’, I probably initially jump straight to mental health conditions, so 
I’d probably start thinking about Depression or Anxiety or things like that. When 
I think of it deeper, I think ‘why?’. Mental health is actually a really broad term, it 
means your psychological health, and that doesn’t actually mean an illness.[…] 
The term mental health makes you think of medical[…]I think it's it kind of 
pushes you down a certain road and I don't think it is….It's such a 
different combination of factors but I think like the word ‘health’ actually 
trips you little bit. If someone said ‘mental wellbeing’, that’s positive 
to me[…]It's another term for mental health, but I feel I wouldn't have even 
thought about like diagnosis or doctors or hospitals. (Kimberly)  
  
The three participants who used both implicit and explicit health talk, began to 
question their earlier taken-for-granted assumptions as the interview created 
space for deconstruction. An example explored by all three was 
the term “inherited” used to explain how difficulties “run in families”. Through critical 
exploration they subsequently made explicit the assumption that this denotes 
genetic causality but how in itself the idea of familial similarities elucidates very little 
about the cause of distress. It was identified that this assumption is deeply held due 
to the power of the pervasive health narrative and those who uphold for it.   
  
I think you can see these things going through families as well, whether or 
not consciously or unconsciously they’re discussed as genetic and whether 
that’s environment or not, we don't know. It’s just kind of fixed in my mind that 
maybe there is a genetic component. But genetics don't have to define 
you […]Part of the reason I believe part of it is like genetic is partly because 
medical professionals have told me this probably is an element and you can 
see it in families if they've got… but also that could just be environment, 
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families are more likely to have the same environment. Then you don't really 
know if it is the nature or is it nurture. (Sukhi)  
  
These latter, more detailed explorations indicate that overall, participants did not hold 
a strong health model for mental health but more likely are influenced by everyday, 
dominant language for conceptualising mental distress.   
  
3.3 Theme 2 – “When Does a Normal Condition Become an Illness?”: Social 
Norm Violation   
  
Nine participants are included in this theme which is similarly constructed 
of contrasting conceptualisations. The four participants who utilised implicit health 
frameworks drew upon the idea of norm violations to explore when a normal 
distressing experience becomes a problem that warrants specialist 
understanding. These social norms are framed to include a clear, causal relationship 
that is implicitly understood by others. Five participants critically explored this, 
establishing that experiences are not abnormal but instead social norms are too 
narrow to clearly make sense of experiences. Violating these norms means others 
cannot implicitly reach this understanding, because they rely upon observable 
proximal rather unobservable distal causes, and literal rather than metaphorical 
language. These variations are included under one superordinate theme to illustrate 
the constant negotiation of social norms, represented in the extracts below.     
  
When we mean psychiatric diagnosis, do you mean something more serious 
like Schizophrenia or do you just mean a normal experience like 
Depression? (Sukhi)   
  
And because people, I think, are often afraid of something that seems different 
or unusual, then it's seen as abnormal.[…] We're all just people, and 
some people are fortunate enough not to be experiencing distress or trauma. 
But those who are, we’re not abnormal. (Agnes)  
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I think ‘normal’ is societally defined and things that are considered irrational by 
people who are not subject to the same pressures as one culture would be 
‘normal’ to people of another culture. (Liena)  
  
The assumption that an experience warranted a psychiatric diagnosis when it 
breached normal societal expectations was taken-for-granted and not explicitly 
named. This abnormality was constructed of when a responding experience was 
classified as ‘irrational’. This appeared to mean disproportionate to its cause, and 
when the cause was unobservable. Unexpectedly, this model was equally applied to 
more noticeably unusual experiences, such as those that could be diagnosed as 
Psychotic, and those more common diagnoses such as Anxiety and Depression, as 
well as non-pathologised, distressing experiences such as stress and 
loneliness. When an experience complies with social norms it implicitly aligns with a 
shared understanding without need for further exploration. This is illustrated below, 
where Jamie explains the distinction between normal and psychiatric Anxiety. They 
use the causal example of hospitalised parents, identifying that others would 
understand as normal to worry for their welfare. This enables a third party 
to implicitly draw a linear, causal relationship between the distressing event and the 
distressed response. Where the social norms have been violated, and thus the 
experience is abnormal for Jamie, is when the emotion of anxiety is coupled with a 
thought pattern and behavioural response that does not appear directly linked or 
proportionate to the causal event, in this example, an obsessive-compulsive 
response. Because an implicit, direct relationship can no longer be made by others, 
the experience is signalled as abnormal.    
  
Anxiety. That's where you have so many irrational thoughts about 
the thing you're anxious about, like “my parents are gonna die if I don't do 
XYZ”. That is not extreme worry. That's the way of thinking that is not your fault, 
obviously, and that will create a barrier to you doing things, day-to-day tasks for 
example, and that is a disability[…]Someone who's really, really worried about 
that, yes, you could say that if someone who's mum’s in hospital and is really 
worried all day that they might not be able to get things done that they would 
usually. But that to me is different, because they could explain that to someone 
who would get it whereas someone with Anxiety saying “if I don't do something 
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in this order, my parents are going to die” and it's just so much harder to say 
that to someone and then get someone to understand you and talk it through 
with you. (Jamie)  
  
Participants talked about their own experiences of mental distress as 
understandable. These experiences were also discussed in relation to an 
identifiable, proximal adversity in the immediate environment, in which a direct, linear 
relationship could be drawn that was observable and therefore understandable 
to others. This is what constituted a socially normal response. Kimberly illustrates 
this with her explanation that delineates her own understandable anxiety, that she 
names ‘situational’ because the cause observable to others, from a diagnostic 
Anxiety which she names ‘Chronic’ because the cause is unclear and so the 
response disproportionate, violating an expected social norm. This abnormal Anxiety 
is implicitly associated with the presence of experiences conceptualised as 
“symptoms”.    
  
I would never say I’m bad enough to say I’ve got Anxiety because I have it in a 
moment, and yeah I might not be able to sleep the night before, but that's not 
my whole life. I can step away from that.[...] I think the main difference is 
‘situational’ [anxiety] is around certain situations. It’s not a constant thing, 
whereas when I think of Chronic [diagnostic] Anxiety I do think of the symptoms 
that people put with that. Obviously you get anxious in a certain situation but if 
you have Anxiety that isn't actually part of the situation, that's just part of your 
everyday. (Kimberly)  
  
The second group of five participants explained that even experiences that appear to 
violate social norms most significantly are also rational and understandable 
responses to adversities. These participants used the example of distal adversities, 
such as institutional racism, that are prolonged and not always directly observable to 
others in the immediate environment. Liena illustrates this, explaining that while it 
may not be clear to others, repeatedly being targeted by the police clearly and 
proportionately leads to paranoia, which she frames as rational due to the necessity 
of this for survival. This therefore frames the social norm as inadequate at 
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capturing distressing experiences because it only understands relationships to 
proximal causes, rather than the experience itself as inherently 
abnormal. Participants identified that individuals who fall outside social norms who 
are more at risk of experiencing these distal adversities, generating a double 
violation.   
  
For people who perhaps are categorised as paranoid about, for example, the 
police coming to get them, I would see that as partially or mostly societally 
produced in the sense that people who are particularly targeted by the police or 
disempowered in society are more likely to be categorised as paranoid[…]And 
it's sort of a spectrum of things where if people have experienced something a 
lot, then I believe it's rational for them to make certain conclusions and make 
certain inferences from things that happen. (Liena)  
  
Other participants explicitly explained how we have shared understandings through 
social norms, but these socially approved ways of understanding and communicating 
experiences of trauma are too narrow. As Agnes highlights, if we looked beyond 
the literal explanations of experiences that appear to violate shared 
understandings and the assumption of clear, linear, causality towards a more 
metaphorical causal relationship, others can also understand the unusual 
experience. She clearly frames this as normal, and the problem lies within 
prescriptive social norms.   
  
You’re re-experiencing that through things like voices or unusual experiences, 
but if that's just supposed to be an illness that you can treat with two, three 
drugs, it’s just such a basic misunderstanding[…]I think it's because there's 
such a narrow idea of what's normal and how you express trauma and you give 
people sort of descriptions where people, for example, see themselves as the 
Queen that's immediately supposed to be abnormal, but what isn't looked at is, 
what is someone trying to express through that that they can't express 
in ordinary everyday language? Because the trauma is too deep, so ordinary 
words just fail you. (Agnes)  
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3.4 Theme 3 – ‘Walking on Dangerous Ground’: The Impact of Categorising   
  
All ten participants negotiated how they understood and used categories, both in 
terms of psychiatric diagnostic labels and social locations, discussing benefits, 
criticisms and conflicts that appeared to generate anxiety for six participants.   
  
3.4.1 “The Label’s Helped”   
Eight participants identified benefits in relation to diagnoses, particularly 
for identifying and accessing appropriate support from services, facilitating an 
understanding for oneself and in communication with others. The necessity for a 
labelling system to meet these needs was agreed, but some challenged the type 
of category that is used.   
  
They can be helpful to get access to certain services, so I see them as a means 
to an end. (Misha)  
  
As Kimberly demonstrates, her anxieties were eased through being able to 
understand all her seemingly disparate health conditions under one, broad, unifying 
label. This one name, rather than a list of symptoms, appeared to serve an affective 
purpose through being containing and reducing anxiety, seeming more manageable 
than the idea of having many conditions.   
  
I know sometimes it [diagnosis] can be good, because you’ve got a name for 
what you're experiencing and that’s quite nice, not to just be experiencing 
‘stuff’.[…]Before there were lots of little things and I thought, why I am someone 
so unlucky to get all of these little things? And then when I realised it was one 
big thing I thought, okay, one big thing is fine. (Kimberly)  
  
The participants were clear that resources do need to be distributed in a systematic, 
justifiable way, and that a categorisation system is necessary to do this. Some 
agreed with the current categorisation system to allocate resources, the psychiatric 
diagnostic system. Others felt it would be more appropriate for the labels to be 
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grounded in constructs that locate the problem in social adversities and not 
individual’s responses.   
  
Because the people are not the problem. It's more how they've been treated is 
the problem[…]It depends on, in some sense, the point of the categorisation 
and who's designing the categorisation. […] I also believe that we cannot 
abolish categorisation without replacing it with something that will actually 
allow people access to resources. Like I don't believe in getting rid of 
Depression and Anxiety and PTSD and all sorts of categories without replacing 
them with social model mechanisms of oppression that will still be just as validly 
seen as credible when it comes to accessing resources[…]Things that actually 
had happened to those people and not being seen as a problem with their 
heads then still being allowed to access support. (Liena)  
  
3.4.2 Criticisms   
All ten participants addressed issues with categorisation. Some explained the 
medical model, under which they identified psychiatric diagnoses to be 
conceptualised, as only one way of making sense of unusual and distressed 
experiences. It was problematic to participants that this is presented as fact without 
alternative options. As Agnes illustrates, there are not equivalent models available 
within systems to conceptualise mental distress in a shared manner and gain access 
to support for those who disagree with psychiatric diagnosis.   
  
The problem is it shouldn't be the only model. Again, you need to meet 
everyone’s ways of conceptualising themselves and their difficulties. That's the 
problem with it, it's not that it shouldn't be there for people find it helpful. […]. 
Someone has the right to make their own choices. But for some of the rest of 
us, we don't have parallel choices to have a different model, to have different 
support system, to refuse to take psychiatric drugs. (Agnes)  
  
Sukhi criticises psychiatric diagnosis for their inherent comparison to a productive 
norm, which implies individuals who receive diagnoses are deficient through their 
inability to achieve to ‘normal’ levels. They outline that the needs of the capitalist  
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system that requires productivity to sustain itself are upheld over the needs of 
individuals, who should be afforded an environment that allows them to be valued no 
matter their productivity.    
  
I just think a lot of the reason they [psychiatric diagnoses] are quantified the 
way they are is because of capitalism. So humans are categorised by how well 
they can be productive[…]it's only until you start applying people to 
environments that aren't suited to them do they become classified as disabled 
or mentally ill. And therefore it's not about the person, it's about society not 
being suited to them. (Sukhi)  
  
Another criticism of labels was that the shared understanding unpinning labels 
is actually only shared amongst certain groups, such as those with Western medical 
training and those who grew up with Western culture. As Zahir demonstrates, this 
can lead to misunderstandings. Jules takes this further, identifying the problem lies in 
the social norms used to define unhealthy experience. As Jules identified, anyone 
who does not align with the majority in the context of where the norms were 
developed, such as anyone not White in the UK, can automatically but 
inappropriately be labelled as abnormal. As she alludes, this can risk stigmatisation 
through pathologising groups of people and certain experiences.  
  
These are because the words in the Asian language when you translate 
them... So if you met me and I was going through some sadness, I would say to 
you, “my heart is hurting” and you will understand what I mean. But if I said that 
in English, you're thinking I'm saying “I'm getting chest pains”. So you're 
automatically thinking I'm saying I've got chest pain, so, culture plays a big part 
in terms of how we define illnesses and health. (Zahir)  
  
It’s because immediately I was thinking about kids in school. Particularly black 
boys, because it’s always like “they’re so naughty and loud” and 
subconsciously judged differently. And then you get labels such 
as Attention Deficit Disorder or whatever and I presume prescriptions are 
made. I don’t know much about it but that’s impression I get is that kind of 
labelling from young age so there's something wrong with them. (Jules)  
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As each interview unfolded, participants began to recognise the process 
of pathologisation and instead draw upon a plethora of non-dominant models to 
conceptualise unusual or distressing experiences, recognising that the power 
afforded to the explanation provided by the medical model is a taken-for-granted 
assumption that is rarely challenged in the mainstream.   
  
How do we know it's an illness, just because the medical terms define it? Just 
because the world of psychiatry has said it. What if it's not an illness, but if it is 
that people are born with certain, let's call it powers, what if that's the power 
he's got that he can go into the universe and the stars in the space world, that 
me and you can't reach out to? What if, you know in the Muslim community we 
believe in Jinns and possession by the Jinn. What if there is such thing as 
ghosts and you know it could be spirits and things like that? […] And we say 
under the mental health condition she was classed as having split personalities 
as the medical term, but the Hindu religion or the culture would say she had 15 
souls in her. […] So we need to further explore when someone has mental 
illness. Why do we always just assume it's only one medical approach to 
defining it? (Zahir)   
  
3.4.3 ‘Not Being Heard’: The Dangers of Questioning   
This theme included six participants and had three main variants. Firstly, participants 
felt questioning diagnoses equated to invalidating the reality of distress, 
secondly, participants struggled to hold both that adversities can happen to 
anyone alongside the greater probability of specific adversities impacting specific 
groups, and finally that understanding someone through the lens of a label would 
obscure their individuality.   
  
Participant's anxieties appeared to be elicited through the act of questioning an 
individual’s diagnosis. It seemed to participants that this would invalidate an 
individual’s distress because it could be understood alongside normal experiences 
which would not validate them as extraordinarily distressing. Moreover, participants 
appeared to equate questioning the reality of the label to questioning the reality of 
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the distress, which they felt would be harmful by denying its existence and 
would constitute gaslighting.    
  
[How people are treated] does cause difficulties that are real, for example, if 
you get really depressed and you really, really find it hard to get out of bed, 
which I've been getting, that is a real problem. (Liena)  
  
Participants also appeared concerned about categorising people into social 
locations, as this may lead to assuming experiences and risk excluding the distress 
of those located upon a more privileged position. This was mostly discussed in 
relation to those from more advantaged socio-economic backgrounds. Participants 
felt this understanding was reductionist.    
  
That doesn't mean obviously that there aren’t problems with people where there 
is money, and I think we need to be cautious. Yeah, there's an assumption that 
these things happen to lower class people and that means that people who 
grow up in middle class households and face abuse and whatever can fall 
through the gaps because no one’s looking. (Maggie)  
  
Participants appeared to experience an internal conflict when negotiating a balance 
between acknowledging that mental health problems can happen to any individual, 
compared with the higher probability at a population level that they can happen to 
individuals located within marginalised groups.   
  
Mental health happens regardless of social class, income and resources. But if 
you were to ask me on a very personal level without a balance, I would say the 
most people that are most likely statistically to experience that and be more 
experiencing more adverse effects of mental health due to the lack of the 
resources, I would say are people with vulnerabilities, are disabled people 
with comorbidities[…]it is the minorities, black people, Asian people. (Misha)  
  
Participants explained the problematic consequence of society’s over 
simplistic conceptualisations of social categories, where the privileged and 
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subjugated positions are dichotomised. As Sukhi demonstrates, the social location 
of ethnicity is understood as a binary in which individuals are either grouped into 
White or not, referred to here as Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME). Sukhi frames 
this assumption that all individuals who are not categorised as White could be 
represented by one person to be harmful, hugely reductionist and devaluing of 
individuals experiences.   
  
I'm the BAME student officer in the Student Union and they are constantly 
asking me what the [BAME] experience is like and I'm like “I don’t know, have 
you heard my accent? I'm European passing. I definitely do not experience the 
same stigma as a black person, you can't ask me what that experience is like”. 
It's very frustrating. (Sukhi)  
  
Misha’s account illustrates that this anxiety about causing harm to people through 
understanding them through the lens of a label originates from her experience of 
the healthcare system. She explains below that herself and the disabled community 
have experienced doctors to assume individuals’ health presentation will align with 
the expected symptoms of a diagnosis, and different experiences are disregarded. 
This results in silencing of different disability experiences, a lack of trusts in one’s 
own bodily perception of reality and in the medical professional as benign.   
  
[to try and understand the difference between someone who described their 
experience as “extreme worry” and someone with a psychiatric diagnosis of 
Anxiety] I think you would be walking on dangerous ground and it's lumping 
people... You got the danger, you're at risk of generalising an experience, 
generalising an impairment, so I'd be very mindful not to do that because 
extreme worry for one person could be completely different to somebody else’s 
experience […] Without more information it’s hard to set parameters and, really, 
although the profession tries to be objective and scientific, how does anybody 
other than the person really know how it affects them truly? And I'm not sure 
how much you're linking this to lived, experiences of disabled people in 
general, but there is a big feeling out in the community with not being heard or 
believed. And when we express concern over physical health they’re often 
minimised […]If you take one wrong footing that person's not gonna open 
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up again because they're gonna feel like you already know everything that 
there is to know[…] so that they've got the fear of being turned away, it’s a very, 
very fine line. (Misha)  
  
Kimberly’s personal experience of her disability similarly alludes to the harm that can 
be caused through assuming someone’s experiences based upon a diagnosis or 
social location. She discussed how being located within the subjugated social 
location of disability felt all-consuming, reductive and eradicating of her individuality 
and how subsequently she found it liberating to explicitly acknowledge that one label 
is not enough to encapsulate an understanding of a whole person. There was a 
repeated desire for medical systems to be able to holistically view individuals, 
which participants experienced to be jeopardised by categorisation.   
  
It’s maybe easier to be like “you got all this all the disabilities and stuff, but 
you're not your disability you’re separate you’re…” You know, like something 
else, not just disabled. Whereas now I'm like “well I am disabled yes, but I'm so 
many other things as well as that”. (Kimberly)  
  
3.5 Theme 4 – Causal Explanations  
  
3.5.1 Explanations for Everyone   
All ten participants drew upon causal explanations that could be equally applied to all 
social groups, including constitutional factors and personal adversity. Some drew 
upon the culturally prevailing Stress-Vulnerability model (Harper et al., 2020), that a 
combination of internal, biological factors precipitated by personal adversity cause 
mental health problems. Whether the individual could manage in a healthy way, 
characterised by socially expected ‘coping’, was afforded by their strength of 
character, a trait which arose internally and existed regardless of external 
circumstances. However, four participants explicitly discussed the problematic nature 
of this individualising of wider social processes.   
  
It can be triggered by events, and it can be caused by events but sometimes it 
can also be genetics where it's part of who you are. (Zahir)  
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These accounts demonstrate multiple implicit assumptions, including that biological 
vulnerability and environmental stressors are distinct rather than integrated (Rose, 
2001) and the prevailing privilege of biological accounts that arguably colonises and 
precedes psychosocial factors (Read, 2005), as can be seen above in the statement 
that genetics constitute “who you are”. This serves to simultaneously reinforce 
biological explanations as primary and negate societal causes by locating the 
problem within the persons ‘oversensitivity’ to harmful environment, rather than 
the social harm itself (Boyle, 2006).    
  
Nine participants referenced inherent causal mechanisms such as genetics. These 
were mainly addressed in taken-for-granted passing and not explicitly explained. The 
pervasiveness of this model may be because it appears to provide language to 
conceptualise embodied psychological experience but actually is only superficially 
available, used as cultural shorthand to make something ‘unknowable’ known. The 
chemical imbalance hypothesis was a key example because it is utilised despite not 
having an in-depth understanding or direct experience of it, and was used to causally 
explain differences in perception.   
  
If you're deficient in certain chemicals, for example, you know because I've 
seen in my family, one of my brothers just really suffers with Anxiety. We've all 
had the same exact upbringing, but it's his perception and how he perceives it. 
But then I think, well, it's maybe deeper than that. Maybe chemically he’s […] 
deficient in certain chemicals and that’s impacted. (Kimberly).   
  
Seven participants referenced a strength of character that enables one to cope with 
personal adversity. The cause of mental health problems was individualised as a 
failure of this. John described the responsibility for people experiencing poverty to 
maintain their mental wellbeing is ultimately upon themselves to actively seek 
help. Kimberly initially describes the responsibly and ability everyone has to decide 
to focus upon certainties rather than dwell upon uncertainties that can lead to mental 
distress. She goes on to acknowledge however that this skill was not developed in 
isolation, but through the support of long-term counselling.     
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[What would prevent poverty from leading to distress?] By making an effort to 
change your lifestyle. “I need to self-help” or reaching out to people (John).  
  
It’s almost like recycling out all these uncertainties and pulling out, actually, 
what can we be certain about? […] And I think for me, anyone can strip away 
that uncertainty. There’s certainties everywhere, and it's actually 
sometimes about focusing on them […]For me it’s easier because I have had a 
few forms of counselling so it wouldn’t have happened overnight… It wouldn’t 
have been like that 10 years ago. (Kimberly)  
  
Some participants challenged the notion of individualising social processes, by re-
contextualising their examples and highlighting power dynamics as more relevant 
to mental distress than constitutional factors. Below, Liena describes how it is an 
individual’s context that shapes both their character and their ability to live in accord 
with this. She describes how those with greater autonomy and access to power 
resources have to face less material consequence as a result of their decisions, 
which may shape their personality. Using the intersectional example of minoritised 
ethnicity and low socio-economic status, Liena contrasts this to those who have less 
access to power resources which forces people to make decisions for survival. She 
highlights this relegates their character irrelevant when understanding their 
circumstances.  
  
It’s also a power dynamic, like personality plays a bigger role in people who are 
socially more empowered, societally and politically more empowered, and a 
smaller role in people who have so much less choice over their 
circumstances. So a billionaire has so many more choices over what they do 
with their money and what they choose to work on than someone who is in a 
job where they cannot find another one and are afraid of, for example, being 
deported if they're going to lose their job as well. There's currently a visa 
program where people have to stick with their original employer and therefore a 
lot of particularly women Au Pairs and people who migrated to work in the UK 
are abused and exploited by their employers, but they can't do anything about 
that because if they do, they'll be kicked out of the country. And I don't think 
what they do then, even if it involves having to submit to whatever the employer 
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says, is their personality as much as the employer's choice, is the employer's 
personality because whoever's got the power has the personal power, and 
therefore their personality is more manifest. (Liena)  
  
3.5.2 Embodied Explanations   
Six participants discussed embodied causal explanations through the psychosocial 
mechanism of bodily insecurity, including extracts where participants referred to the 
impact of embodied problems on mental health. In line with dominant models, 
they distinguished between the body and mind in their language, although seemingly 
attempting to convey an understanding of the mind and body as a unified whole, as 
can be seen in Jules’ account below. Her body’s experience of pain and sensory 
discomfort was inseparably intertwined with her corresponding mental distress. As 
such, this theme well represents the struggle we experience to convey non-dominant 
conceptual models in the absence of access to linguistic alternatives by which to 
conceive them.   
  
You cannot have insomnia and pain without it affecting your mental health and 
even just discomfort like for me and being really sensitive to temperature and 
noise and light levels and things like that, things that cause discomfort. It's 
almost like torture. Those unwanted sensory inputs or things your brain can't 
cope with or process and you know, there is going to be a mental health impact 
around that kind of experience. (Jules)  
  
The notion of rationality was discussed in relation to these embodied experiences, 
with participants explaining that conceptual models of social norm violations are 
inappropriate for understanding the disabled experience. As Maggie explains, fear 
is a normal and understandable response to their physical condition, in which their 
blood pressure can drop suddenly, resulting in falls. However, to others this is seen 
to violate social norms. This may be because fluctuations in blood pressure is an 
adverse event that is not directly visible to others, who may then interpret Maggie’s 
fear as disproportionate, and therefore irrational, violating social norms and 
constituting an abnormal experience.    
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Being insecure about once physical health can also be a factor in that for me, 
for instance, I had problems where part of the issue I have with my blood 
pressure dropping sometimes is if something causes me acute stress, my blood 
pressure could drop, and obviously my blood pressure dropping is acutely 
stressful, so it's one of those kind of being afraid of fear itself situations, and no 
matter how rational I am about it, it's difficult to manage that. (Maggie)   
  
Participants discussed a plethora of psychosocial mechanisms via which these 
embodied experiences could lead to mental distress. In Jules’ example below, she 
describes restricting communication and social interaction as a necessary 
requirement to manage bodily exhaustion and sustain physical health, but that this 
can have detrimental impact on mental health through limiting access to social 
support. This extract of self-restriction appears to separate the mind and the 
body and position their needs as opposing.   
  
I was thinking about disability, like myself with ME, I have a friend who is just 
too exhausted to communicate, you just can’t communicate as much as you 
would like and its very isolating, I barely ever get to talk to my mum on the 
phone because it’s just so exhausting, even if you can do it because you have 
that rush of adrenaline it’s just so exhausting afterwards it just isn’t worth 
it. […]You have to hold yourself back and it’s so difficult, sometimes you really 
want to keep going because you have this rush of adrenaline or whatever but 
you just can’t. Its constantly restricting yourself. (Jules)  
  
Kimberly’s account strikingly described the impact of a separation of the mind and 
body and how this leads to mental distress. She described her physical health 
conditions including heart failure and the resulting distressing relationship to 
herself where her mind wanted to punish her body for failing. She alludes to the 
instability and insecurity caused by missing this grounding connection of one’s mind 
to their actual body, as well as anger and fear resulting from this disconnection.   
  
I had a big problem for a long time of separating me and my body, I saw us as 
two different things and I’d do things to my body to punish it for doing things to 
me. But now I’ve had therapy I’m like ‘why?’. If I had a bad day, if I was feeling 
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really upset, I'd self-harm because that’s what you deserve, what your body 
deserves for putting me through that[…] For so long I had that split between… 
my physical body and my mental self. I felt like I don't wanna go blind or I don't 
want heart failure that’s the body that's decided this, I haven't and we had that 
disconnect… I mean I had that disconnect for such a long time. (Kimberly)  
  
3.5.3 Oppressive Impact of Social Norms   
This includes all participants and was a significant focus of the 
interviews. Participants addressed social norms which centres the privileged social  
location and how being considered to violate this causes mental distress. This 
occurred through two main pathways. Firstly, participants described denying or 
hiding parts of themselves in order to be experienced by others as more closely 
aligned with social norms. Secondly, violating these norms could lead to social 
exclusion, which risked isolation and discriminatory attacks. This theme was 
constructed of complex descriptions of the cumulative impact of multiple 
disadvantages and discriminatory experiences.   
  
A particularly harmful oppressive discourse addressed was social norm of 
independence. The taken-for-granted assumption of being able to look after oneself 
is in the immediate sense, by having no one physically around to care for personal 
needs. This ignores the normal proximal emotional dependence, such as through 
relationships and normal distal dependence upon others, such as services that build 
houses, generate electricity and water. This related to visibility. Participants with 
disabilities were especially constrained by the need for productivity that defines 
neoliberal society, that further defines independence as the ability to work 
to financially support oneself. To violate this social norm meant one’s worth was 
devalued by society.   
  
What we value in terms of thinking of what gives us a sense of achievement 
and what gives us a sense of being valuable within society. Often that comes 
with a very sort of internalised ableism of “I haven't achieved anything today, 
therefore I'm worthless. I haven't helped anybody or I haven't made any money 
for myself or I'm dependent or I'm useless”. Without that ableist construct, 
  
- 59 - 
 
because we all exist and therefore it's OK that we exist and there’s value and 
worth in that you don't have to do anything to prove that you're worth existing. 
(Jules)  
  
Misha takes this further, highlighting the dangerous impact of dualistic social 
narratives on mental health, describing the independence narrative as a 
dichotomy between being seen as either superhuman, for which she would have to 
achieve over and above what is classed as normal, or otherwise be treated as a 
‘scrounger’, a burdensome person that needs the others support. Both the 
pressure this leads to, and this dehumanisation are understandably distressing and 
are related in a vicious cycle. As Misha describes, working hard to achieve and 
being seen as ‘superhuman’ was a powerful, proud experience, but when this was 
lost, through no circumstance of her own, the depth of the fall into the polarised 
‘scrounger’ was devasting.   
  
I couldn't get the support in work so also fell apart because then it was like I’m 
failing, I'm gonna lose my job and as a disabled person that was a big part of 
my identity because we fight so hard against traditional, well I do, I fight so hard 
against the traditional narratives of disabled people either being superhuman 
because they're in athletics, or benefit scroungers. And I was so proud of 
myself when I got my first job because I was able to say I'm not completely 
relying on support. (Misha)  
  
The cumulative impact of being positioned within intersecting subjugated social 
locations was drawn upon by participants as key to understanding the multiple fronts 
from which they had to deny parts of their self that are not societally accepted in 
order to feel fundamentally safe and valued. As Misha and Zahir describe, the impact 
of being positioned to violate multiple social norms is cumulative and distressing. 
This was because these are internalised and lead to inner conflicts, as Misha 
describes between the two parts of herself. This also leads to multiple parts of the 
self being minimised in order to try present a self that is more aligned with culturally 
prevailing norms. As Misha describes, she was ‘condemned’ for both her female sex 
and her disability, she perhaps felt a need to distance herself from vulnerable and 
feminine traits. Perhaps correspondingly Misha describes her Indian culture taught 
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her that to seek help, that could be seen as vulnerable and feminine, was seen as a 
‘failure’, support that she earlier described as vital. Misha alludes to feeling a 
pressure or responsibility for the condemnation her family experienced. 
Understandably, this may have distanced Misha from valuing herself and 
living peacefully and authentically as her female, disabled self.   
  
It’s like 2 parts of me and I have, because it very much in India, Asian culture 
and particularly Indian you're socialised to not share your mental health. You do 
not share your dirty laundry. You do not seek support outside. If you do, you 
failed. It shows the community and those around you that you can't 
cope. There's a deficit in your family[…]One of the downsides of how I was 
socialised about Hinduism is that you must have done something wrong in your 
previous life and about reincarnation and karma to be experiencing what you 
are experiencing. So not only did I have medical model attitudinal barriers of 
individual deficit but also religion had the same, a condemning effect on me as 
well. Not just me, but my family as well because they had a disabled 
daughter and also the pressures of having a daughter as well just in Asian 
communities, but also disabled daughter and I believe that I'm impacted my 
parents' mental health. (Misha)  
  
Because of oppression, not because of who you are, but the oppression and 
discrimination that you face[…]if you don't feel accepted by society is it's very 
hard to accept yourself. (Zahir)  
  
Jamie similarly describes the need to perform a public self in line with social 
norms as a protective strategy against violating them. They reflect how the constant 
struggle of this alongside the distress the private/authentic self feels results in the 
individual having experienced without really living, a life. As this performed life 
progresses, the individual may feel they have more to lose, such as the family 
described in Jamie’s extract and the pressure of sustaining this performance may 
then prevent individuals from feeling able to seek or receive support.    
  
I was just existing. I always thought about killing myself, but I was always just 
like “I just didn't feel like person”. But you do the things you need to do for 
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people think you're a person and…you’re just constantly acting and you know 
exactly what they want to see and you will do it and you have that crazy skill to 
do that. It's like a whole performance. But it's not really living and it's 
really, really bad for you, and I think there are a lot of people out there that will 
live…they'll be like 45, will have kids and they'll have this performance of a life 
and then they'll kill themselves suddenly and people have no idea why. (Jamie)  
  
Jamie’s description demonstrates how binary, dualist social locations lead to harmful 
societal narratives through the teaching that the privileged binary position, men in 
their example, are owed and can exploit those in the subjugated position, which 
establishes and consolidates power. Understandably as Jamie indicates, this can 
lead to mental distress through dehumanisation, abuse and the removal of bodily 
autonomy.   
  
I know anyone could abuse anyone no matter what gender, but the end of the 
day I happen to live in a time society-wise where men do have more power, 
and they're told that they are owed power and that they owed the ownership of 
bodies, particularly like female bodies as well. (Jamie)  
  
The extension of these subjugated narratives led to the second pathway by which 
participants conceptualised violating social norms as harmful, through social 
exclusion. Maggie demonstrated that when resources are scarce or demands on 
privileged, normalised groups are high, the subjugated, norm-violating group are 
seen and treated as disposable, stripping individuals of the inherent value of their 
lives. This has been acutely visible in the context of Brexit, as described in 
Maggie’s account, where they describe the distress of being consistently confronted 
with the imposed narrative of burdensome and worthlessness.   
  
It has been very clear that disabled people are seen as disposable by a huge 
number of people[…]Now after these things have happened and much more 
acute awareness that people don't care if we die, a lot of the time and having 
that present in one's life again and again, encountering that sentiment or being 
told, sometimes aggressively, we don't care if you die, why should we care? 
(Maggie)  
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This social exclusion was impacted by being positioned upon multiple, intersecting 
marginalised social locations and was powerfully demonstrated by Zahir. His 
experiences of racism, whilst painful and undoubtedly detrimental for his wellbeing, 
were more tolerable than his experiences of homophobia because of the protective 
nature of a sense of belonging and solidarity to the Pakistani and Muslim 
communities. The restriction of access to these community resources was discussed 
as exposing individuals to risk of physical attack and as such, a constant sense of 
unsafety.   
  
I'm a gay Muslim man and I had a lot of, as a teenager, a lot of mental health 
issues, and I know that was because, a major part was because of my 
sexuality. Not that being gay was an issue, the fact that not being accepted and 
being around positive role models and growing up in an environment which was 
saying being gay is wrong and you choose to be and God hates you and you 
can't be a Muslim.[…] You know, just sort of just having one person say it's OK. 
You know we love you no matter what. It makes a big difference. (Zahir).   
  
3.5.4 Institutional Explanations   
The construction of this theme was also substantial, incorporating a significant 
proportion of transcripts. It addresses how institutional harm, through the restricted 
access to needed services and resources, and the policies that uphold 
institutions, lead to mental distress. The participants mainly drew upon the 
examples of health and social care. This theme therefore incorporates a double 
tyranny in that institutions designed to support those already in mental distress 
reproduce it.   
  
Participants discussed the deeply held societal assumption that medical knowledge 
equate to facts. As Maggie illustrates, this professional knowledge is continually 
privileged and upheld against lived experience knowledge when they 
contradict. Maggie demonstrates the need for bodily autonomy and consent, which 
can be forcibly removed in line with medical knowledges interpretation of best 
interest.    
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As an intersex person, you know, I know the difference between what doctors 
say and how a lot of people would prefer to be living their lives, in the number 
of people I know who've had their genitals cut as infants who really, really didn't 
want to be in that situation, never had the chance to consent, and doctors still 
say it's the best thing that could have happened to them and they feel very 
differently about that. (Maggie).   
  
Participants described how institutions resist hearing from people with mental 
distress or disabilities regarding the ways in which they are harmful and increase 
distress. Agnes explains how the recent Mental Health Act public consultation, 
developed by professionals and policymakers to supposedly be accessible, is 
not. She describes how this further exacerbates mental distress by interlocking 
people in vicious cycles of powerlessness, through causing distress through inviting 
distressed individuals to work hard to contribute to feedback but setting up people to 
fail through the length of the procedures that are inaccessible during acute distress. 
Ultimately, harmful, distress causing systems and policies remain the same, and the 
experience of contributing to this reinforces people’s devalued position and sense of 
powerlessness, further exacerbating distress.   
  
The consultation is also very unsuitable. For example, there are I think 35 
questions, all of which you're invited to comment further on. For someone who's 
feeling acutely distressed and those are the people whose voice most need 
hearing, you can't spend hours on it. Also it means that you have to had read 
the whole of 180 page white paper. There is an executive summary, but it's 
very glowing and it doesn't actually give you a real sense of what the white 
paper actually means. And similarly for people with learning difficulties[…]. 
Understandably, with everything that can be difficult, when you've got a learning 
disability and also experience mental distress, that accessible document is over 
50 pages long. And again, with the same number of questions. And the other 
concern about it is again, it doesn't seem to give a fair view of what the White 
paper really is about. It still gives a glowing impression of it, so that's what I 
mean about powerlessness. (Agnes)  
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Liena’s extract expands this point made above, further demonstrating how 
institutions cause mental distress through instilling powerlessness. She explains how 
often, people’s choice of understanding and managing their distress is restricted, 
because the current institutions gatekeep access to resources through 
diagnoses. She described how people are required to accept that they are in some 
way deficient in their ability to cope with homelessness in order to supported with 
managing the distress this understandably causes.   
  
It's often the only way to access services and necessary material support 
[…]if someone's homeless and poor and they need to have disability diagnosis 
to gain their disability social security then they have to, to some extent, conform 
or allow oppressive structures to categorise them so that they can access what 
they need to survive. (Liena)  
  
Systems are further constructed so that the default position is disbelief of the 
accessing individual, and as such the burden of proof falls upon them to 
demonstrate why they are deserving of a limited resource. This was understood to 
devalue individual’s realities, positioning their intensions and morals as questionable 
and subject to punitive investigation. The repeated need to prove oneself as 
both physically deficient and incapable as well as worthy was understood to lead to 
mental distress through replication of trauma and coercion.   
  
Its dehumanising, they try to foster a hostile environment and it's 
so dehumanising[…]It’s not like you go in and they give you stuff, you have 
to prove that a million times and you have to go over your trauma a million 
times to get any sort of semblance of support. (Sukhi).   
  
Misha further describes the harm causes by professionals denying her need, despite 
her condition and subsequent needs being clearly visible. This is invalidating her 
suffering, doubly harmful as positioned from a system that is supposed to ameliorate 
this suffering. This serves to uphold the narrative of disabled individuals as ‘less 
than’ the norm, through treating her as unworthy of support she clearly, visibly, 
needs.   
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You know it’s very much visible a lot of what I suffer from, and even me, I have 
to spend half my life defending why I need support even to my everyday care 
support. The only people that really, truly understand me or people who have 
lived with me. So my partner who's able bodied, my best friend who I lived with 
for a bit, but it's really, really small, the people that we can trust in, the people 
that we diverge our insecurities. (Misha)  
  
Services were also understood to cause mental distress through making accessing 
individuals feel like they need to compete with each other in order to access the 
resource. This was described by Liena to further isolate individuals from 
communities with similar diagnoses, who may have been an invaluable source of 
social support. Leina also implies this to lead to mental distress through reinforcing 
the narrative of the self as undeserving, which sustains social norms that blame 
struggling individuals for needing of support.   
  
It's sort of a way of gatekeeping I guess. Pits against each other because then 
you get the narrative of... For example, if you're anorexic, you’re not 
underweight enough to be treated in eating disorder service and that sort of 
thing where people are compared against each other and seeing this 
undeserving because other people are more deserving. [It’s] generally 
neoliberalism and trying to pit people against each other so that the people who 
are withholding resources get to point the blame at other people. […]And like 
the idea of people who already experience some sort of shared oppression with 
other people in the sort of community that they have been segregated into in 
some way[…] So you sort of get put into an outside group and then you 
develop understandings from being in an outside group. (Leina)  
  
Participants also addressed the ways in which society can contribute to mental 
wellbeing. As Maggie succinctly summarises, being protected from adverse social 
events maintains wellbeing. Leina’s extract expands upon this, highlighting that it is 
the lived experience of discrimination that comes from being located within a 
marginalised group that allows for in-depth understanding into structural oppression 
leading to mental distress. Taken together, these suggest that those located within 
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more privileged positions are more likely to conceptualised mental distress as 
caused by internal factors.   
  
I think some people are mentally well because nothing has ever really gone 
wrong for them, in which case they stayed mentally well. (Maggie)  
  
Life experience and the more marginalised you are, the more well this is 
statistically backed up in research. The more you believe that external 
environment really affects your life choices in life and life outcomes and it 
makes sense because, for example, I have found as a rule, even though there 
are other people who seem like they’re exceptions, but I think on a sort of 
spectrum sense, people who are cis, white, male, straight and rich are most 
likely to believe in individual control and individual mental health, even though 
they could also experience oppression in some ways. People who are on the 
very other end most likely to believe in life experience and there not being a 
mind problem[…]in a society where there’s sexism and that women have had to 
experience one form of structural oppression, so on average, understand more 
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4.0 DISCUSSION  
 
This chapter considers the findings in relation to the research questions and existing 
literature, whilst considering their implications followed by a critical appraisal. To 
remind the reader, the research question is: how do disabled members of the 
general public understand mental health and what social processes influence this.  
I have organised the findings here by topic area rather than theme name, in order to 
allow me to address overlapping and interrelated aspects from multiple themes.  
 
4.1 The Impact of Health Language 
 
It appeared that the everyday available language for participants to construct an 
understanding of mental distress is health (L’Hôte et al., 2018; Pescosolido et al., 
2010). My positioning of distress of ‘mental health’ was described by some 
participants to result in these health assumptions being drawn upon. These health 
models appear to contain numerous implicit, taken-for-granted assumptions about 
the nature of distressing experiences (L’Hôte et al., 2018). Namely, that medical 
systems provide diagnoses when patterns of observable symptoms are reliably 
associated with an underlying, measurable, biological pathology (Boyle, 1990). 
Psychiatric diagnosing is assumed to be the same, therefore culturally positioned as 
an act of discovering of a pre-existing, underlying entity within a distressed individual 
that manifests in symptoms (Boyle, 1990; Georgaca, 2013).  For some participants, 
the act of diagnosing was sometimes positioned to reify the existence of this entity. 
However, in psychiatric systems, the relationship of symptom patterns to underlying 
measurable pathology has not been identified nor has reliability between symptom 
patterns (Bentall, 2004). Some of the participants seemed to draw upon assumptions 
of genetic essentialism, the underlying belief that biological ‘essences’ define 
categories in a deterministic manner (Haslam, 2005; Lebowitz & Appelbaum, 2019). 
These assumptions did not appear explicitly available knowledge for participants 
who implicitly used a health framework. It also appeared that the health language 
could lead to constraining of prevention, which was framed as idealistic and 
impossible by these participants (L’Hôte et al., 2018). 
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Participants also drew upon other conceptual frameworks in depth. It has been 
argued we all hold multiple causal frameworks that we move between depending 
upon context (L’Hôte et al., 2018). When asked to make explicit the underlying 
health assumptions participants were drawing upon, some struggled to do so, 
sometimes utilising the assumption as evidence in a circular manner. An example 
was that the identification of a biological process was implicitly assumed to precede 
causally, rather than follow, distress (Harrop et al., 1996). Whereas, as the interview 
progressed and space was made for questioning, most participants began to draw 
upon other models, aligning with the SDH (Compton & Shim, 2015). This process of 
moving from an individualistic health conceptualisation to critically appraising these 
assumptions is also noted elsewhere (Peacock et al., 2014). This may suggest the 
process of using health language that leads to health assumptions being drawn upon 
is a weakly held model that constrains structural understandings. This contrasts 
other research that concludes the public do not understand the SDH (Raphael, 
2006), and that the health model is the most strongly held conceptual framework 
because when underlying assumptions of other frameworks are explored participants 
revert to the individualist health model of understanding (L’Hôte et al., 2018).  
 
This difference could be explained by multiple reasons. It may be due to the social 
location of these participants as disabled. L’Hôte et al’s (2018) sample was 
described as representative of the UK population in terms of demographics, who 
may arguably be norm-conforming as they represent the majority, and so may have 
less experience of structural oppression. Alternatively, it may be due to the apparent 
realist epistemological position of L’Hôte et al (2018), who seem to present 
professionals as in possession of the ‘correct’ knowledge regarding health causes, to 
which public understanding is compared. This may have led to a different 
engagement with the material to myself from a relativist epistemological position, 
whereby neither professional nor public knowledge were framed as ‘correct’.  
 
  




4.2 The Limits of Social Norms   
 
Some participants appeared to implicitly draw upon social norms to conceptualise 
what constitutes a mental health problem, appearing to make sense of unusual or 
distressing behaviours as abnormal (Haslam, 2005; Pilgrim & Rogers, 1993). For 
some participants, these norms seemed to be incorporate an unusual or distressing 
response to which a clear, linear relationship could be drawn in a proportionate 
relationship to an observable cause in the immediate environment. Breaching these 
rules appeared to result in the response being labelled irrational, which was implicitly 
assumed to constitute abnormality and therefore a mental health problem.  
 
It appeared that other participants felt norm violation models were inappropriate to 
conceptualise mental health (Boyle, 1990). This appeared to be because current 
social norms cannot incorporate structural causes or metaphorical ways of making 
sense of experiences because these cannot be directly observed by others. This 
appears a different focus to the construct of norms as seen elsewhere (Haslam, 
2005).  
 
Negotiation of norms as a conceptual model of what constitutes mental health did 
not arise in L’Hôte et al’s (2018) interviews. This could be taken as evidence for the 
assertion that when considering ‘health’ generally mental health is implicitly 
conceptualised in the same way as physical health, because when these terms are 
separated people spend time negotiating what constitutes mental health.   
 
Unexpectedly and contradicting existing research (Boyle, 1990; Haslam, 2005), 
participants used more common diagnoses, such as Anxiety, to explain social norm 
violations equally as frequently as more obviously unusual diagnoses, such as 
Psychosis. Within this participant group I understood this as potentially related to 
ableism due to a neoliberal society that defines value by productivity and autonomy 
(Greener et al., 2010; Watermeyer, 2013). This group may experience 
shame/discrimination due to the societal assumption of violating this norm, and so it 
may be more accessible due to direct experience and emotional salience.  
  
- 70 - 
 
 
4.3 Impact of Emotional Processes  
 
The findings outlined in theme three suggest that the process of negotiating using 
both social locations and psychiatric diagnostic categories is emotional (Carter et al., 
2018; Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017; Smith & Anderson, 2018). This emotionality is not 
addressed in other literature that examines the negotiation of multiple frameworks 
(L’Hôte et al., 2018).  
 
For psychiatric diagnostic labels, these conflicting emotions appeared to arise 
because participants thought that questioning the reality of a diagnosis equated to 
denying an individual’s experience of distress (Boyle, 1990). Participants also 
discussed the institutionally embedded nature of diagnoses (Harper, 2013). This may 
explain why this participant group, who have perhaps greater interface with state 
systems of support, may have reacted emotionally to the notion of challenging the 
diagnosis, because in material reality this could impact one’s ability to access 
necessary support. Simultaneously, for other participants these labels were framed 
as themselves representing oppression, because people are forced to conceptualise 
their distress as an individualised deficit to obtain access this necessary support, 
(Hagan & Smail, 1997). This indicates the conflicting, complex and emotional nature 
of this argument.  
 
For social locations, participants seemed anxious to convey the differences of 
individuals positioned within social locations by resisting naming health inequalities 
(Popay et al., 2003; Smith & Anderson, 2018). This has been argued to be a process 
through which to resist stigma and shame and reassert control to minimise fatalistic 
anxiety and/or hopelessness (Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017; Smith & Anderson, 
2018). These participants resisted this categorisation for themselves and for others.  
One participant explained that this anxiety originated from the personal and 
collective harm caused by medical professionals’ denial, questioning and minimising 
of individual illness experiences when they violated expectations based upon 
diagnoses. This suggests that participants lived experiences of institutional 
oppression and harm evoke desire to minimise this harm in others through the 
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resistance of labelling. This has important implications for PMH that I will return to 
address in section 4.6.2.  
 
4.4 Causal Conceptual Frameworks 
 
Multiple causal conceptual frameworks were drawn upon to understand mental 
health (Carter et al., 2018; L’Hôte et al., 2018). It was explained that lived experience 
of marginalised social positions was facilitative to utilising this understanding over a 
more individualised understanding (Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017; Mackenzie et al., 
2017).  
 
4.4.1 Explanations that Individualise Social Processes  
All participants addressed causal models in line with the dominant Stress-
Vulnerability model (Harper et al., 2020; Larsson, 2013). This theme included the 
idea of strength of character that affords individuals control, where a failure of this  
personal willpower is seen as a cause of mental health problems (Bolam et al., 2004; 
L’Hôte et al., 2018; Popay et al., 2003). This can be understood as an example of 
the individualisation of social processes (Hagan & Smail, 1997). This has been 
argued to occur in neoliberal and unequal societies because these lead to a 
hierarchical stratification of society in which an individual’s sense of internal worth 
and external value is attributed depending upon social status (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2017). This need to upwardly, favourably compare to others is therefore positioned 
as a survival strategy (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2017). Alternatively, this can be framed 
as a defence against unbearable emotions, whereby individuals need to construct a 
favourable identity even when they are positioned to violate social norms, which can 
occur through the attribution of a strong sense of character to the self (Popay et al., 
2003).   
 
4.4.2 Disability and Embodiment   
In line with dominant models, participants appeared to draw upon Cartesian Dualism 
to conceptualise the self. This distinguishes the mind and the body as distinct entities 
(Abrams, 2016). To my knowledge, this has not been identified in the context of PMH 
research. These findings can be argued to provide insight about how social norms 
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lead to health inequalities (Compton & Shim, 2015) for the disabled community. The 
impact of this potential separation of the body and mind is important to consider 
when conceptualising public health and PMH.   
 
Social norms can be communicated in dichotomies, as participants referenced here 
(i.e. the disabled superhero or scrounger). Dichotomous thinking can lead to harmful 
consequences (Karban, 2016). It could be argued that some of these were 
addressed here, including the needs of the body and mind being positioned as 
separate and sometimes conflicting. For example, the need to restrict one’s 
communication and therefore social interaction, itself framed as a psychological care 
need, was a necessity in order to care for the body’s needs. The body was therefore 
sustained at the expense of the mind and mental health, which again, is important 
when conceptualising public health and PMH.  
 
Participants referenced neoliberal and western social norms about productive, 
autonomous bodies being valued (Greener et al., 2010; Watermeyer, 2013). It has 
been argued from a critical psychoanalytic perspective that it is damaging to 
individual’s wellbeing to live in a society that positions them as deficient 
(Watermeyer, 2013). These social norms appeared to interact with dominant models 
of Cartesian Dualism in harmful ways in that it may have generated propensity for 
splitting (Marks, 2002) and have been argued to contribute to oppression (Marks, 
1999). This refers to a Kleinian defensive psychological process whereby individuals 
attempt to clearly separate the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ in themselves, others and/or the 
world, attempting to eliminate the ‘bad’ and leave only goodness (Gomez, 1997). 
This could lead to the unequal access of resources/healthcare, as described by 
participants, through the potential internalisation of the neoliberal social norm that 
positions the disabled body as ‘bad’ (Marks, 2002) and so people may see 
themselves as undeserving of resources. At the extreme end, one participant 
described how this separation lead to the mind, potentially positioned as the good 
object, attempting to annihilate the ‘bad’ body through punishing it for failing.  
 
Alternatively, the dichotomy here may have been drawn upon for a beneficial 
purpose, ensuring professionals do not conflate physical conditions with mental 
distress or deny the reality of their physical conditions through explaining it 
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psychosomatic (Marks, 2002). This was referenced by participants as a form of 
iatrogenic harm, against which this splitting could be conceptualised as resistance. 
Further understanding of the function and impact of Cartesian Dualism for the 
disabled community may be an important precursor to developing acceptable and 
accessible PMH interventions.  
 
4.4.3 Oppression   
Participants demonstrated complex understanding of the SDH as described by 
Compton & Shim (2015) through identifying the oppressive impacts of social norms 
and institutions. Elsewhere it is concluded that the public do not understand the SDH 
(L’Hôte et al., 2018; Raphael, 2006). While L’Hôte et al., (2018) identify the public to 
understand governmental responsibility, they conclude the public do not understand 
the role of power relations or discrimination in causing mental health problems. This 
was not the case here.  
 
The psychiatric diagnostic system is understood to be the culturally dominant model 
for making sense of unusual or distressing mental experiences in the UK (Burr, 
2003). The findings here suggest that it may be difficult to align a causal 
understanding of oppression with this dominant model, which may be due to 
oppressive macro-structural causes not being directly observable, and because the 
experiences resulting from oppression were understood as normal, contradicting the 
norm violating models that the language of health could lead people to draw upon.  
 
4.4.3.1 Oppressive Impact of Social Norms  
It was indicated that those with lived experience inequality know the widespread 
extent of its impact (Peacock, 2012) and have shared implicit understandings of this. 
Participants implicitly appeared to discuss social norms as shaped by those with 
power. To be positioned outside of these norms lead to the risk of being 
discriminated against. The discussion of discrimination as a causal framework 
appeared to draw upon an implicit understanding of mental distress as an 
understandable, not abnormal, response, as the cause was knowable to others who 
experienced this discrimination, even if not directly observable. Furthermore, the 
resulting distress was not discussed using health language that draw upon 
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intrapsychic assumptions but appeared to implicitly draw upon a relational 
understanding of distress. For example, it appeared a taken-for-granted fact that 
mental distress existed within the interface of needing independence from burdening 
others, in the loneliness that was located in the absence of others through social 
rejection and in the paranoia towards being targeted by the police. These emotions 
did not appear to be discussed intrapsychicly in the oppressive causal model.  
 
A plethora of oppressive social norms were drawn upon by participants as causal of 
mental health problems. These were drawn upon differently than previous research, 
which concluded the public discuss cultural norms only insofar as to what health 
related choices they facilitate and constrain, therefore obscuring structural causal 
frameworks (L’Hôte et al., 2018). Here, participants described that negative 
psychological impact of being positioned to violate social norms.  
 
One social normal frequently referenced was of independence and if violated, feeling 
burdensome which damages self-worth (Vassilev et al., 2014; Watermeyer, 2013). 
The type of independence described by the participants as desirable by society was 
narrow, in that it was immediate and visible whereby one should be able to manage 
their physical and financial needs, rather than acknowledging the ways in which we 
are all interdependent (Reindal, 1999; Wendell, 1996; White et al., 2010). This 
finding dovetails with previous research, whereby independence is conceptualised 
as a constituting factor of good health (L’Hôte et al., 2018). The difference in 
valence, of these findings describing this as harmful, may be due to the participant 
group, who are more likely to violate this norm through physical health conditions.  
 
The harmful impact of not aligning with social norms was discussed through 
inauthenticity. Participants described a need to be seen to live in line with socially 
acceptable norms through constructing a protective but inauthentic self, in order to 
prevent social exclusion. To achieve this sometimes meant to deny the parts of the 
self that violated these norms. To not do this was to risk social exclusion, which 
could lead to isolation or physical attack. The causal impact of social norms did not 
arise in other research (L’Hôte et al., 2018) nor did the psychosocial mechanism of 
inauthenticity (Smith & Anderson, 2018). There are numerous possible ways this 
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impact of inauthenticity could be made sense of. One example is that, in line with the 
abovementioned, the development of a protective but inauthentic self may serve as a 
form of resistance against painful emotions. This could alternatively be interpreted to 
allow individuals to reassert control (Smith & Anderson, 2018).  
 
Some participants drew upon intersectional frameworks to explain understand the 
multiple fronts from which they had to deny parts of their self that are not societally 
accepted to feel safe and valued. They appeared to feel dominant understandings, 
that address only singular positions, were incompatible with understanding the whole 
self holistically. They appeared to bring in intersectionality to address the interlocking 
impact of the cumulative social norms of which they violated on their sense of self, 
but also to conceptualise from which community supportive resources were 
accessible. Quinn et al (2019) label this as intersectional stigma. Different shared 
language utilised by the public and by professionals can lead to communication at 
the societal level breaking down (L’Hôte et al., 2018). As most participants here 
seemed to bring multiple social locations, including gender, disability, ethnicity, 
minority religions and culture, alongside structural determinants, perhaps their 
language of “holistic selves” reflected what professionals mean by “intersectionality”.   
 
4.4.3.2 Oppressive Institutions  
Participants highlighted a multitude of structural discrimination against disabled 
communities in line with SDH (Gartrell et al., 2018). It was addressed how health and 
social care systems re-enact oppression based upon social norms, which in turn 
restrict individuals from marginalised groups access to care (Mattheys et al., 2018; 
Parry et al., 2007). This then appeared to lead to distrust of services that were 
positioned as a risk to wellbeing (Canvin et al., 2007). Participants appeared to relate 
this to mental distress through the psychosocial mechanisms of powerlessness, a 
sense of injustice, being blamed, gaslighted and ignored (Smith & Anderson, 2018).  
 
4.5 Critical Review  
 
There are important limitations to this research that have ethical considerations. 
These were carefully considered in the design and implementation with the aim to 
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minimise harm but are presented here to normalise a culture of accountability. I do 
not intent this to diminish the findings, of which I evaluate in line with guidelines of 
good quality qualitative research (Spencer & Ritchie, 2012).   
 
4.5.1 Generalisability  
Methodological limitations of the research impact the extent to which conclusions 
can be drawn and applied to other individuals who identify as disabled. These 
include the small sample size and the large heterogeneity of the sample. Part of 
aligning intersectionality with TA requires acknowledgement that conclusions drawn 
from this specific group are socially, historically and contextually bound, and may not 
continue to be fair conclusions for the same group over time. The current UK socio-
political context is polarised, presumably influencing the findings, including Brexit 
and the Coronavirus-19 pandemic, which were described by participants to bring into 
acute awareness ableist societal narratives. Furthermore, the language of health 
during the pandemic is arguably more acutely available to the public. All of these 
factors limit the generalisability of the findings. However, as I earlier argue, using an 
intersectional lens means the value of generalisability is limited given that the 
assumption of within category homogeneity is rejected.  
 
4.5.2 Appropriateness of Thematic Analysis and Intersectionality  
I found it challenging to align TA with intersectionality due to their divergent 
underlying assumptions. As outlined, intersectionality rejects the assumption of 
within category similarities, whilst TA is based upon this assumption to allow a 
researcher to draw conclusions from their sample based upon a shared 
characteristic. It has been widely acknowledged that it is challenging to conduct 
qualitative research from an intersectional lens, which is similarly reflected in the lack 
of explicit guidelines for how to do so (Bowleg, 2012). Bowleg (2012) states that 
trying to understand health disparities using only one location obscures 
understandings of the complexities in which multiple experiences of discrimination 
interact to produce health inequalities, which has inevitably occurred here as I only 
used the social locational of disability. I have outlined in section 2.2 how I attempted 
to align these differences, for example drawing upon intersectionality’s assumption of 
within category variance by recruiting a diverse sample. As explained, I utilised this 
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method rather than recruiting participants from specified, multiple, social locations in 
order to reduce the imposition of categories that can restrict experience. My aim was 
that, by focusing on one social location, I could use an intersectional lens to explore 
the within category differences within this social location, which is different from how 
the literature I identified had operationalised the intersectional lens. However, a huge 
array of different conceptualisations drawn upon between participants. This made it 
difficult to construct overarching themes representative of the whole dataset and as a 
result, a large amount of nuance felt lost. I also found it difficult to interpret 
participants responses based on their social location when they did not explicitly 
name the influencing location. Therefore, this may not have been the most 
appropriate solution. TA also meant I was unable to examine within participant 
variance in depth, for example the nuances of the processes that lead to initial 
implicit health frameworks being recognised and critically examined as the interview 
progressed.  
 
I also endeavoured to manage this conflict by bringing intersectionality into the 
themes. However, this was also difficult as only some of the participants brought this 
explicitly, and each participant’s social locations and experiences were different. 
Other intersectional qualitative research has managed this dilemma by explicitly 
recruiting participants from multiple intersecting social locations in order to draw 
conclusions from this intersection (Quinn et al., 2019). However, this continues to 
violate the assumption of within category homogeneity and involves the researcher’s 
imposition regarding which intersecting positions may be relevant. This is difficult to 
justify from a PMH perspective, in which the entire population should be considered.  
 
4.5.3 Personal/Professional Reflexivity  
I struggled with the ethical dilemma of conducting research with participants located 
within a subjugated social position that I am not a part of. There have rightly been 
criticisms of this as it can be experienced as exploitative (Kagan et al., 2019). This 
reinforces the relational power dynamic as unequal, inadvertently and indirectly 
upholding epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) and positioning communities as worthy 
of being studied but unable to actively contribute to this. It has been suggested that 
researchers should embed themselves in the community of interest prior to 
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commencing research (Kagan et al., 2019). Research could then be truly 
collaboratively developed, centring the actual need of the community, rather than the 
researcher imposing their beliefs as to what would be helpful. As I am not disabled, I 
am unable to fully immerse in the community. In the absence of this it is suggested 
that research should be co-produced (Kagan et al., 2019). This would involve people 
who identify with the location of ‘disabled’ being involved collaboratively at each 
stage, through developing the research questions, designing the method and 
interview questions, recruitment and analysis. This level of co-production takes time 
and I believe it would be unethical to request this without the ability to adequately 
pay those involved for their work. Neither option could occur in the available 
timeframe with the available resources. Ultimately, I concluded that while the 
research is problematic in these ways, I could mediate this harm with transparency 
with participants, allowing people to decide for themselves given this context whether 
to participate, and by gifting vouchers to thank participants for their time. 
Furthermore, I firmly believe there is need for those who benefit from discrimination 
and current power inequalities in society to do the work to challenge and disrupt this 
process.  
 
Problematically, research in the field of health prevention is still expert driven 
(Garthwaite et al., 2016; Smith, 2013). Due to the requirements of the thesis, to 
contribute psychological knowledge, I have inevitably taken the expert position 
through interpretation of the participants semantic and latent talk and linking this with 
existing theory (Willig & Rogers, 2017). There are clear limitations to me positioning 
lived experience as valuable expertise, and then superimposing my knowledge and 
interpretation onto this. This can contribute further to hermetical injustice (Fricker, 
2007) by shaping available information through an inaccessible, academic lens. 
Given the historical systemic ableism described by participants and the impact of this 
on relationship with the disabled community this had the potential of being harmful. I 
aimed to manage this dilemma in several ways. Firstly, my intention was to equally 
value the opinions of the participants with my psychological understanding of 
processes, positioning both types of knowledge as equally ‘true’ and helpful, enabled 
through the relativist epistemology (Pilgrim, 2017). Despite this intention, a sense of 
obligation was evoked within me in response to participants who expressed a sense 
of responsibility to engage in the research due to its work with an under-represented 
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population in order to ultimately benefit others. Through a desire to respect their 
accounts, I may have at times been too realist in my interpretations in order to 
represent exactly what they wished, and at other times too interpretative, for 
example to justify aspects that were not evidence based or in line with my personal 
values. I recognise that my privileged position enables me to take an ideological, 
value-based stance at times when the participants may need to take more pragmatic 
position, for example, accepting individualised deficit models in order to access 
services.  
 
These differences in social location between myself and the participants may have 
influenced the research process. Some participants discussed the harm caused by 
the health and social care system. The project was advertised as a part of my 
training to qualify as a Clinical Psychologist, naming my position within this system. 
This may therefore have influenced who came forward to participate. This may have 
subsequently influenced what the participants felt able to share potentially skewing 
answers towards the psychologically-socialised, dominant model of individualising 
distress. This may explain some of the contradictory findings, of those that focused 
more on the individualised conceptual frameworks than structural ones. This has 
implications for my conclusions, which need to be held tentatively, of the impact of 
health frameworks obscuring access to structural conceptual frameworks, as this 
may have been a considered and conscious decision.  
 
4.5.4 Managing Resulting Complexity  
There is substantial complexity within the topics of PMH, disability and 
intersectionality. A huge number of different disciplines, models and ideas are 
relevant, all of which use similar terminology in largely different ways (such as 
addressed in 1.2.7). Upon reflection, it appears I have attempted to manage this 
complexity through attempting to be more certain, for example in my conclusions. 
This was particularly impacted by the personal uncertainty facing all of us during the 
pandemic and by the fact that the thesis was an assessed piece of work. I was 
unsure of how it would be received to be uncertain and to leave some questions 
unanswered. I had hoped to reach some clear conclusions but the process of 
conducting the research has made me aware of a range of complexities and 
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ultimately has left me with more questions than answers. I have not managed to 
illuminate with any clarity how intersectionality might best be addressed within 
research, or how inter-category heterogeneity might be investigated, recruited, asked 
about or interpreted. Although I had attempted to reduce some of the complexity 
when designing the study by focusing on only one social location, disability, the 
constructions of mental health were hugely variable. This meant that I cannot 
conclude with any certainty or clarity which social locations or influencing social 
norms and ideologies related to different constructions of mental health. I have also 
found it difficult to shed light on how best to discuss even one social location, given 
that there are so many different definitions and meanings of disability and a range of 
explanatory frameworks and epistemological standpoints. Given this uncertainty, it is 
difficult to consider what may be helpful next steps for the field of PMH 
 
4.5.5 Evaluation  
I have evaluated the research in line with Spencer and Ritchie’s (2012) three criteria 
for good quality qualitative research, as outlined below.  
 
4.5.5.1 Credibility 
I hope to have demonstrated credibility, referring to the plausibility of the conclusions 
drawn. Given that an array of difference was demonstrated by the participants, which 
I hope to have highlighted through explicitly naming how many participants are 
incorporated in each theme, I have intended to draw only tentative conclusions that 
themselves are grounded in the findings of previous research. Furthermore, through 
my deliberate consideration of a relativist epistemological position (Pilgrim, 2017) 
coupled with first person language, I have intended to demonstrate ownership over 
my role in actively constructing the conclusions.  
 
4.5.5.2 Rigour 
Rigour refers to the documentation and demonstration of the research process in 
order to highlight how the method and design allow the research to meet its aim 
(Spencer & Ritchie, 2012). I hope to have demonstrated this through transparency of 
the thoughtful decision-making processes which are detailed in Chapter 2, section 
4.5.2 and the inclusion of a reflexive account (Appendix A). Furthermore, I have 
  
- 81 - 
 
endeavoured through the inclusion of extracts in Chapter 3 to illustrate my claims as 
grounded in the participants talk. I have included examples of early thematic maps 
(Appendix G) and an early coded transcript (Appendix I) to further evidence how I 
constructed the themes in line with TA guidelines (Braun & Clarke, 2006).   
 
4.5.5.3 Contribution and Implications  
I have also considered Spencer and Ritchie’s (2012) third guideline, contribution, 
which refers to the value and relevance of the research. I believe the contribution of 
the research is valuable for multiple reasons. Firstly, this is the first psychological 
research to my knowledge that investigates PMH explicitly, rather than public health 
generally, through in-depth qualitative analysis. From previous public health 
research, it is unclear how mental health is conceptualised and from this we can 
assume it is conceptualised, uncritically, in line with physical health. These findings 
suggest there are additional nuances to mental health that are obscured by 
investigating only ‘health’. Namely, the negotiation of social norms in defining which 
experiences are identified as abnormal. This is in addition to the harmful impact of 
social norms that contribute to the unequal distribution of opportunity and resources 
within Compton and Shim’s (2015) conceptualisation of the SDH, which, as outlined 
in section 1.2.4 contributes to the determination of which social groups needs are 
privileged. If replicated, this finding has implications for PMH and models of the SD 
of mental health, through a potential need to consider the complex interaction of both 
usages of social norms. This is unlike physical health needs, which are not identified 
based upon norm violations.  
 
A second nuance regarding mental health that investigating only health obscures is 
the different, non-dominant conceptualisations of what mental distress is (section 
1.2.3). As these findings could suggest, mental distress may be implicitly 
conceptualised differently depending upon the causal model being discussed. It 
appeared that participants may have drawn upon psychiatric conceptualisations of 
mental distress and these assumptions when the language of health was utilised, 
whereas when using structural frameworks to discuss macro- and micro-level 
discrimination participants may have implicitly drawn upon a relational 
conceptualisation and underlying assumptions. These assumptions appeared to be 
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regarding the normality of the experience, a shared ‘knowing’ that was not based 
upon visibility, and the framing of the mental distress as located within relational 
interactions rather than an intrapsychic deficit. Furthermore, structural causes were 
related to understandable distress, which may be able to be considered as 
preventable, whereas psychiatric diagnoses were not seen as preventable. These 
potentially have implications for PMH. This could be because communication related 
to health, for example through the NHS or PHE, may constrain an understanding of 
mental distress to the health model and obscure structural understandings. This may 
therefore impact how the public understand and relate to health services engaging in 
macro-structural interventions.  
 
Furthermore, this research contributed to psychological literature by addressing 
some methodological and epistemological limitations outlined as in section 1.4.3 and 
1.4.4, which has allowed me to consider two processes which may have influenced 
which causal models were drawn upon at different times. Firstly, the in-depth 
interview methodology utilised here allowed the potential impact of the language of 
health to be illustrated, as well as the non-dominant conceptualisations this may 
initially obscure to be highlighted. Whilst there are multiple interpretations regarding 
which conceptual framework is held most strongly and the contextual factors that 
influence when various are drawn upon (L’Hôte et al., 2018), I have endeavoured to 
justify my different interpretation (section 4.1). I believe it an important one for 
consideration, as if replicated, may have multiple implications. Firstly, this may 
suggest why some research has identified the public not to understand the SDH 
(L’Hôte et al., 2018) by reframing this as a methodological issue and not related to 
public knowledge. Secondly, this may have implications for the ways in which PMH 
communicates as a public facing system. As suggested, opening space to recognise 
and critically explore assumptions may allow the health framework to be recognised 
as just one explanatory framework, facilitating discussion of non-dominant (Peacock, 
2014). This may not align with the current PMH model of quickly consumable 
awareness raising campaigns (PHE, 2019; Smith, 2017).  
 
The second process I have considered here that may influence which causal model 
is drawn upon at which time is the process of defending against painful emotions. I 
believe is an important contribution to both PMH and psychiatric diagnostic debates 
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and may not yet have been considered in enough depth. This may go some way to 
explaining why the health framework is upheld against logical and evidenced critique 
(Harper, 2013). Furthermore, this has implications for PMH and understanding the 
SDH. These findings suggest, along with others, that the public understand health 
inequalities but can sometimes resist naming them (Smith & Anderson, 2018). If a 
preventative strategy is designed based upon this evidence, it may need careful 
consideration of the language used to communicate and justify it, because those 
who do not faced by the inequality may deny it in favour of personal strength of 
character explanations for their healthiness (Garthwaite & Bambra, 2017; Mackenzie 
et al., 2017) while people who do experience the inequality may challenge naming 
this to resist fatalistic anxiety (Popay et al., 2003). It has been argued that a limitation 
of qualitative research is that it does not adequately address emotional process. I 
have since become aware of psychosocial methodology which claims to consider 
emotional defences that may arise during research (Hollway & Jefferson, 2013). 
Further research could be undertaken from this methodology. There is a danger that 
this could lead to the expert voice predominating and I would therefore advocate for 
this to be undertaken using co-production approaches.  
 
Finally, the contribution of this research to how upstream social norms impact 
disabled individuals’ mental distress and the ways in which the healthcare systems 
can cause iatrogenic harm can be useful to practising clinical psychologists. For 
example, this may suggest ways to include social context in formulations, locating 
problems within restrictive social norms rather than in individualised deficits. This 
may also suggest a focus for the work of clinical psychologists working with medical 
teams and/or long-term health conditions could be around mending the systems 
relationship with the disabled community, through supporting discussions of 
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4.6 Recommendations  
 
4.6.1 For Research  
These findings may suggest we need to further investigate, using in-depth qualitative 
methodology, the different ways in which the public conceptualise what constitutes 
mental distress and what contextual factors influence these different models. One of 
the influencing contextual factors may be the causal model being drawn upon. The 
different causal models and what contextual factors influence these being 
differentially drawn upon could also be elucidated further. Moving forward with PMH 
may be difficult without an understanding of these models, influencing processes and 
whether these differ for different groups in society. The outcomes of these further 
findings may be additionally investigated using wider scale quantitative methodology 
to elucidate population level group differences. 
 
More broadly, I think this research demonstrates both the value of and limitations 
with in-depth qualitative research. As outlined in section 1.2.5, PMH research and 
academia should work to position multi-paradigm method as gold standard rather 
than RCT’s alone which have been argued to be inappropriate for the investigation of 
the impacts of upstream structural causes (Larson, 2013). This multi-disciplinary 
collaboration could be an aim of future PMH research. Further work towards 
generating guidelines for producing intersectional qualitative work would also be 
beneficial.  
 
There is a growing body of literature in the UK shows those from lower socio-
economic backgrounds have complex understandings of SDH (Smith & Anderson, 
2018). These findings suggest that disabled individuals may also draw upon complex 
understandings of the mental health impacts of structural factors. In regards to PMH, 
further investigation with both the disabled community and other marginalised groups 
is warranted to establish whether this finding is replicated in the UK socio-political 
context. I believe this should be positioned within research of the lay public as a way 
of bringing in intersectionality, acknowledging that we all are positioned within 
multiple privileged and oppressed social locations simultaneously (Bowleg, 2012).  
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The initial pervasiveness of the health framework in research into public discourse 
could be seen as a demonstration of Fricker’s (2007) hermeneutical injustice. 
People, especially those with lived experience of personal marginalisation and 
structural discrimination, may have an implicit understanding of SDH, but these are 
obscured in research findings by the deeply embedded culturally dominant health 
frameworks that are more readily available. This is perpetuated by the elitist, 
institutional blocking of access to shared academic language developed to 
conceptualise other understandings of mental distress, which is actively hid behind 
paywalls and expensive higher education courses means that it is difficult to move 
away from the language of health in everyday discourse. This hermeneutical 
injustice upholds testimonial injustice, through the positioning of the general public 
as lacking knowledge in how they conceptualise health (Fricker, 2007). In order to 
not perpetuate health inequalities and epistemic injustice, I recommend the system 
of PMH academia to prioritise the sharing of knowledge with the public that is co-
produced and free at the point of access.  
 
4.6.2 For PMH Policy and Prevention 
I have separated PMH from research for the purpose of clarity, although recognise 
that policy and prevention in PMH cannot be implemented without further research 
into the suggested areas. It has been argued that academic work regarding the SDH 
has had little effect on the actual process of policymaking due to individualistic 
approaches fitting with neoliberal government structures and not easily aligning to 
structural (Raphael, 2006).  From these findings I have two main, tentative 
recommendations for PMH priorities that may contribute facilitate policymaking: 
developing shared language and working with public services to minimise iatrogenic 
harm.  
 
Policy documents that state they are addressing structural causal factors have been 
argued to quickly revert to individualised language (Larrson, 2013). As identified by 
L’Hôte et al (2018) gaps in shared language can lead to communication breakdown. 
I have considered here whether these participants may have been referring to what 
professionals name as intersectionality through a language of being holistic. 
Furthermore, mental distress appears to be conceptualised using different language 
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at different times. These could suggest that an initial priority for PMH is to develop a 
shared language across professionals, the public and incorporating different social 
groups. We cannot implement different strategies without a shared language 
regarding what and how distress is being targeted. This could also include a 
consideration of how these conversations are held. As suggested here and 
elsewhere (Peacock, 2014) quick conversations may result in the dominant health 
framework being drawn upon, but space for exploration can facilitate the use of non-
dominant conceptual frameworks.  
 
A further aim of developed a shared language could be a standpoint from which to 
consider prevention. These findings may suggest, in line with others, that health 
frameworks may restrict thinking regarding prevention (L’Hôte et al., 2018) which is a 
neglected research area (Rose-Clarke et al., 2020). Another aim of this is to develop 
shared language that is not over simplistic. For example, the participants identified 
multiple ways in which dichotomous positioning of social locations and discourses 
around social norms, such as the disabled hero or scrounger, are harmful. PMH 
could work with the public to develop a shared language around which to 
communicate complex ideas in ways that do not perpetuate harm. This prevents 
reifying social policy as the only way to address the SDH, which of course extend 
from the macro to the micro level, embodied and lived within individual’s identities 
and experiences.  
 
Secondly, in the UK mental distress is often supported through healthcare services. 
Smith (2013) identified that UK public health research does not often address 
unequal access to healthcare as a SDH because the NHS is free at point of access. 
However, these findings suggest that there are access difficulties, framed by 
participants here as neoliberal gatekeeping of resources, and then iatrogenic harm, 
which may influence re-accessing of services. In these findings iatrogenic harm was 
a strong narrative, also discussed in relation to other state services including social 
care, the benefits system and the police. Potentially then, PMH may need to 
consider unequal access to mental health care and other services as a SDH and 
develop joined up working with these public services to educate awareness and then 
prevent this. These findings could suggest that this may need to be a PMH priority, 
as even if we move towards primary prevention, those with current mental health 
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problems who need to access services still need to be considered. This focus can be 
argued as having the potential to be more effective than current PMH interventions 
that target downstream lifestyle and behaviour choices (Smith, 2013; Whitehead, 
2007; Wilson et al., 2013). These findings may add to this literature that suggests the 
use of these interventions be minimised.  
 
Both of the above priority suggestions may be impacted by these findings that 
suggest the influential role of emotional processes in discussing SDH, mental health 
and the psychiatric debate for both the public and potentially professionals. These 
findings suggest that these emotional processes may be influenced by lived 
experiences of the SDH and structural discrimination (Sweeney, 2015). As above, 
we cannot figure out together how to move forward without understanding the 
emotional processes, as a result of lived experience, that influence engagement with 
the conversation. Furthermore, when working to minimise iatrogenic harm as 
perpetuated by public services, this may need to begin with services confronting the 
ways in which structural violence is enacted through systems that exacerbate health 
inequalities (Josewitz, 2017). This has the potential to evoke distressing emotions as 
those who enter the helping professions are likely to have done so in order to help 
others, which may mean they are susceptible to defences that allow disavowal of 
responsibly or contribution to harm (Menzies, 1960).  
 
4.6.3 For Practising Clinical Psychologists  
Whilst not the aim of the research, I believe the findings may indicate some 
recommendations for practicing clinical psychologists.  
 
Participants discussed how some of the disabled community are wary of the clinical 
psychology profession because of our tendency to individualise and psychologise 
problems related to physical health conditions and pain, which is experienced as 
invalidating. I recommend that we work to bring the disabled lived experience to the 
forefront of mainstream clinical psychology, so that we have a better understanding 
of how to work with this without reproducing further harm, given that 20-25% of our 
clients may be disabled (DWP, 2018). One way in which this could be achieved 
would be to engage in more co-production work with service users, in order to 
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disseminate contextually relevant understandings within specific teams. These 
research collaborations could then link in with local clinical psychology doctorates in 
order to embed this lived experience understanding into teaching. This may go some 
way to begin to mend the distrust some of the disabled community may have 
towards our profession (Canvin et al., 2007).  
 
Another potential impact for clinical psychologists is around the language and 
models used to conceptualise distress. As suggested here, psychiatric diagnostic 
language was utilised less when drawing upon structural causal models for mental 
distress, which also positioned the distress as understandable and therefore normal. 
In discussions with services, individuals who utilise these models and underlying 
assumptions may not be seemed ‘psychologically minded’ (Larrson, 2013). This 
could further perpetuate inequalities in access to healthcare as individuals not 
‘psychologically minded’ may be excluded from accessing therapy (Larrson, 2013). 
Potentially clinical psychologists could better develop an integration of different 
models by which to conceptualise mental distress and it’s causes into service 
models.  
 
4.7 Concluding Reflections  
 
PMH is incredibly complicated. I believe there is no one ‘right’ causal understanding 
of mental health inequalities, but that there are multiple more ‘helpful’ 
understandings and that these are ever-evolving according to time, place, and social 
locations (Rose-Clarke, 2020). Because of this, I think it is important we bring as 
many difference perspectives to light as possible and managing the resulting 
complexity, which is what I have endeavoured to do here. However, the process of 
conducting this research has been immensely challenging, raising uncertainties, 
complexities and perhaps more questions than answers. With regards to addressing 
disability as a social location, the various different meanings have been difficult to 
align when considering other research, participants different opinions and my own 
views. Regarding intersectionality, I remain uncertain of how these complex, 
overlapping ideologies can all be considered and discussed without becoming 
reductionist. Through my attempts to incorporate these ideas and capture the fluidity 
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of SDH, I have unintentionally reified the linear causal models I set out to critique. 
This points to a significant limitation of intersectional approaches to PMH, how 
overwhelming this can seem, which can result in what Nutbeam (2004) terms 
‘analysis paralysis’, the avoidance of engaging in the appropriately complex required 
research. I certainly experienced this myself when trying to identify, read, interpret 
and integrate findings from different disciplines, each with epistemological positions, 
methodology and interpretations. It is likely this has impacted other disciplines and 
research, and we cannot tackle this large, overwhelming and complex picture if we 
cannot better integrate different disciplines research, policymakers and public 
conceptualisations (Josewski, 2017). Therefore, whilst I believe an intersectional 
framework is the most ethical from a judgemental rationalism perspective to conduct 
research, is it the most ‘helpful’ when it comes to supporting policymakers to decide 
on action? Perhaps not.  
 
Regarding the suggested implications to PMH, substantial further work is required.  
This research is just a small piece in the puzzle, which I have struggled during the 
process to come to terms with, feeling the need to ‘fix’ or contribute something 
hugely impactful. In reality, to manage time and resource restrictions and ‘analysis 
paralysis’, a large amount of small pieces need to be conducted to build the overall 






















- 90 - 
 
5.0 REFERENCES  
  
 
Abrams, T. (2016). Cartesian dualism and disabled phenomenology. Scandinavian 
Journal of Disability Research, 18(2), 118–128. 
 
Afuape, T. (2011). Power, resistance and liberation in therapy with survivors of 
trauma: To have our hearts broken. Routledge. 
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415611893/ 
 
Afuape, T. (2020). Radical systemic intervention that goes to the root: Working 
alongside inner-city school children, linking trauma with oppression and 
consciousness with action. Journal of Family Therapy, 42(3), 425–452. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6427.12304 
 
Afuape, T., & Hughes, G. (2015). Liberation practices: Towards emotional wellbeing 
through dialogue. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/products/9781138791138 
 
Airey, L. (2003). “Nae as nice a scheme as it used to be”: Lay accounts of 
neighbourhood incivilities and well-being. Health & Place, 9(2), 129–137. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1353-8292(03)00013-3 
 
Albee, G. W. (1999). Prevention, not treatment, is the only hope. Counselling 
Psychology Quarterly, 12(2), 133–146. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515079908254084 
 
Angermeyer, M. C., & Dietrich, S. (2006). Public beliefs about and attitudes towards 
people with mental illness: A review of population studies. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 113(3), 163–179. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0447.2005.00699.x 
 
Backett-Milburn, K. C., Wills, W. J., Gregory, S., & Lawton, J. (2006). Making sense 
of eating, weight and risk in the early teenage years: Views and concerns of parents 
in poorer socio-economic circumstances. Social Science & Medicine, 63(3), 624–
635. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.02.011 
  
- 91 - 
 
 
Backett-Milburn, K., Cunningham-Burley, S., & Davis, J. (2003). Contrasting lives, 
contrasting views? Understandings of health inequalities from children in differing 
social circumstances. Social Science & Medicine, 57(4), 613–623. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00413-6 
 
Barnes, M. C., Gunnell, D., Davies, R., Hawton, K., Kapur, N., Potokar, J., & 
Donovan, J. L. (2016). Understanding vulnerability to self-harm in times of economic 
hardship and austerity: A qualitative study. BMJ Open, 6(2), e010131. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2015-010131 
 
Bell, K., & Green, J. (2016). On the perils of invoking neoliberalism in public health 
critique. 
 
Bentall, R. (2004). Madness explained: Psychosis and Human Nature. Penguin. 
 
Berghs, M., Atkin, K., Graham, H., Hatton, C., & Thomas, C. (2016). Implications for 
public health research of models and theories of disability: A scoping study and 
evidence synthesis. Public Health Research, 4(8), 1–166. 
https://doi.org/10.3310/phr04080 
 
Berridge, V. (2009). Medicine, public health and the media in Britain from the 
nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-seventies. Historical Research, 82(216), 360–373. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2281.2008.00489.x 
 
Bignall, W., Jacquez, F., & Vaughn, L. (2015). Attributions of Mental Illness: An 





Blaxter, M. (1983). The causes of disease: Women talking. Social Science & 
Medicine, 17(2), 59–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(83)90356-8 
 
  
- 92 - 
 
Bolam, B., Murphy, S., & Gleeson, K. (2004). Individualisation and inequalities in 
health: A qualitative study of class identity and health. Social Science & Medicine, 
59(7), 1355–1365. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.01.018 
 
Bolam, B., Murphy, S., & Gleeson, #Kate. (2006). Place-identity and geographical 
inequalities in health: A qualitative study. Psychology & Health, 21(3), 399–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14768320500286526 
 
Bowleg, L. (2012). The problem with the phrase women and minorities: 
Intersectionality—An important theoretical framework for public health. American 
Journal of Public Health, 102(7), 1267–1273. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2012.300750 
 
Boyle, M. (1990). Schizophrenia: A scientific delusion? (pp. viii, 248). Taylor & 
Frances/Routledge. 
 
Burr, V. (2003). Social constructionism. London: Routledge. 
 
Cairney, P. (2019). Understanding public policy. Red Globe Press. 
 
Canvin, K., Jones, C., Marttila, A., Burström, B., & Whitehead, M. (2007). Can I risk 
using public services? Perceived consequences of seeking help and health care 
among households living in poverty: qualitative study. Journal of Epidemiology & 
Community Health, 61(11), 984–989. https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2006.058404 
 
Carter, L., Read, J., Pyle, M., & Morrison, A. (2018). ‘I believe I know better even 
than the psychiatrists what caused it’: Exploring the development of causal beliefs in 
people experiencing psychosis. Community Mental Health Journal, 54(6), 805–813. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10597-017-0219-3 
 
Cattell, V. (2001). Poor people, poor places, and poor health: The mediating role of 
social networks and social capital. Social Science & Medicine, 52(10), 1501–1516. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(00)00259-8 
  
- 93 - 
 
Cole, E. R. (2009). Intersectionality and research in psychology. American 
Psychologist, 64(3), 170–180. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014564 
 
Compton, M. T., & Shim, R. S. (2015). The social determinants of mental health. 
Focus, 13(4), 419–425. 
 
Crenshaw, K. W. (2006). Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against 
Women of Color. Kvinder, Køn & Forskning, 2–3, Article 2–3. 
https://doi.org/10.7146/kkf.v0i2-3.28090 
 
Davidson, R., Kitzinger, J., & Hunt, K. (2006). The wealthy get healthy, the poor get 
poorly? Lay perceptions of health inequalities. Social Science & Medicine, 62(9), 
2171–2182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.10.010 
 
Davidson, R., Mitchell, R., & Hunt, K. (2008). Location, location, location: The role of 
experience of disadvantage in lay perceptions of area inequalities in health. Health & 
Place, 14(2), 167–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2007.05.008 
 
Dolan, A. (2007a). ‘Good luck to them if they can get it’: Exploring working class 
men’s understandings and experiences of income inequality and material standards. 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 29(5), 711–729. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2007.01012.x 
 
Dolan, A. (2007b). ‘That’s just the cesspool where they dump all the trash’: Exploring 
working class men’s perceptions and experiences of social capital and health. 
Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness & Medicine, 
11(4), 475–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363459307080869 
 
Dotson, K. (2014). Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression. Social Epistemology, 
28(2), 115–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 
 
Duffy, S. (2013). A fair society? How the cuts target disabled people. Sheffield: Centr
e for Welfare Reform  
  
- 94 - 
 
 
Fricker, M. (2007a). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Garthwaite, K., & Bambra, C. (2017a). “How the other half live”: Lay perspectives on 
health inequalities in an age of austerity. Social Science & Medicine, 187, 268–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.05.021 
 
Garthwaite, K., & Bambra, C. (2017b). “How the other half live”: Lay perspectives on 
health inequalities in an age of austerity. Social Science & Medicine, 187, 268–275. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.05.021 
 
Garthwaite, K., Smith, K. E., Bambra, C., & Pearce, J. (2016). Desperately seeking 
reductions in health inequalities: Perspectives of UK researchers on past, present 
and future directions in health inequalities research. Sociology of Health & Illness, 
38(3), 459–478. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.12374 
 
Gartrell, A., Jennaway, M., Manderson, L., Fangalasu’u, J., & Dolaiano, S. (2018). 
Social determinants of disability-based disadvantage in Solomon islands. Health 
Promotion International, 33(2), 250–260. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapro/daw071 
 
Georgaca, E. (2013). Social constructionist contributions to critiques of psychiatric 
diagnosis and classification. Feminism & Psychology, 23, 56–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353512467967 
 
Glover, L., Dyson, J., Cowdell, F., & Kinsey, D. (2020). Healthy ageing in a deprived 
northern UK city: A co-creation study. Health & Social Care in the Community, 28(6), 
2233–2242. https://doi.org/10.1111/hsc.13036 
 
Gomez, L. (1997). An introduction to object relations. NYU Press. 
 
Grace, C., Begum, R., Subhani, S., Kopelman, P., & Greenhalgh, T. (2008). 
Prevention of type 2 diabetes in British Bangladeshis: Qualitative study of 
  
- 95 - 
 
community, religious, and professional perspectives. BMJ, 337, a1931. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a1931 
 
Greener, J., Douglas, F., & van Teijlingen, E. (2010). More of the same? Conflicting 
perspectives of obesity causation and intervention amongst overweight people, 
health professionals and policy makers. Social Science & Medicine, 70(7), 1042–
1049. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.11.017 
 
Hagan, T., & Smail, D. (1997). Power-mapping—I. Background and basic 




Hankivsky, O., & Christoffersen, A. (2008). Intersectionality and the determinants of 
health: A Canadian perspective. Critical Public Health, 18(3), 271–283. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09581590802294296 
 
Harper, D. J. (2013). On the persistence of psychiatric diagnosis: Moving beyond a 
zombie classification system. Feminism & Psychology, 23(1), 78–85. 
 
Harper, D., O’Donnell, E., & Platts, S. (2020). A “trigger”, a cause or obscured? How 
trauma and adversity are constructed in psychiatric stress-vulnerability accounts of 
“psychosis”. Feminism & Psychology, 31(1), 19–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353520954313 
 
Harrop, C. E., Trower, P., & Mitchell, I. J. (1996). Does the biology go around the 
symptoms? A copernican shift in schizophrenia paradigms. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 16(7), 641–654. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7358(96)00039-6 
 




- 96 - 
 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most people are not 
WEIRD. Nature, 466(7302), 29-29. 
 




Hodgins, M., Millar, M., & Barry, M. M. (2006). “… it’s all the same no matter how 
much fruit or vegetables or fresh air we get”: Traveller women’s perceptions of illness 
causation and health inequalities. Social Science & Medicine, 62(8), 1978–1990. 
 
Hollway, W., & Jefferson, T. (2013). Doing Qualitative Research Differently: A 
Psychosocial Approach. SAGE Publications, Ltd. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526402233 
 
Jorm, A. F. (2000). Mental health literacy: Public knowledge and beliefs about mental 
disorders. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 177(5), 396–401. 
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.177.5.396 
 
Josewski, V. (2017). A ‘third space’ for doing social justice research. In M. Morrow & 
L. H. Malcoe (Eds.), Critical inquiries for social justice in mental health. (2018-10501-
002; pp. 60–86). University of Toronto Press. 
 
Karban, K. (2016). Developing a Health Inequalities Approach for Mental Health 
Social Work. British Journal of Social Work, bcw098. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcw098 
 
Kagan, C., Burton, M., Duckett, P., Lawthom, R., & Siddiquee, A. (2019). Critical 
community psychology: Critical action and social change: Routledge. 
 
Larsson, P. (2015). What can be done about the social determinants of mental 
health? Perspectives in Public Health, 135(1), 16. 
 
  
- 97 - 
 
Larsson Patrick. (2013). The rhetoric/reality gap in social determinants of mental 
health. Mental Health Review Journal, 18(4), 182–193. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/MHRJ-04-2013-0013 
 
Lebowitz, M. S., & Appelbaum, P. S. (2019). Biomedical Explanations of 
Psychopathology and Their Implications for Attitudes and Beliefs About Mental 
Disorders. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 15(1), 555–577.  
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050718-095416 
 
L’Hôte, E., Fond, M., & Volmert, A. (2018). Seeing upstream: Mapping the gaps 
between expert and public understandings of health in the United Kingdom. 
Washington, DC: FrameWorks Institute. 
 
Link, B. G., Phelan, J. C., Bresnahan, M., Stueve, A., & Pescosolido, B. A. (1999). 
Public conceptions of mental illness: Labels, causes, dangerousness, and social 
distance. American Journal of Public Health, 89(9), 1328–1333. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.89.9.1328 
MacDonald, R., & Shildrick, T. (2013). Youth and wellbeing: Experiencing 
bereavement and ill health in marginalised young people’s transitions. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 35(1), 147–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01488.x 
 
Macintyre, S., McKay, L., & Ellaway, A. (2005). Are rich people or poor people more 
likely to be ill? Lay perceptions, by social class and neighbourhood, of inequalities in 
health. Social Science & Medicine, 60(2), 313–317.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.001 
 
Mackenzie, M., Collins, C., Connolly, J., Doyle, M., & McCartney, G. (2017). 
Working-class discourses of politics, policy and health: ‘I don’t smoke; I don’t drink. 
The only thing wrong with me is my health’. Policy & Politics, 45(2), 231–249. 
https://doi.org/10.1332/030557316X14534640177927 
 
Marks, D. (1999). Dimensions of oppression: Theorising the embodied subject. 
Disability & Society, 14(5), 611–626. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599925975 
  
- 98 - 
 
 
Marks, D. (2002). Some Concluding Notes-Healing the Split Between Psyche and 
Social: Constructions and Experiences of Disability. Disability Studies Quarterly, 
22(3). 
 
Mattheys, K., Warren, J., & Bambra, C. (2018). “Treading in sand”: A qualitative 
study of the impact of austerity on inequalities in mental health. Social Policy & 
Administration, 52(7), 1275–1289. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12348 
 
McDermott, E., Hughes, E., & Rawlings, V. (2018). The social determinants of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender youth suicidality in England: A mixed 
methods study. Journal of Public Health, 40(3), e244–e251. 
 
McGarrol, S. (2020). Contextualising lifestyles: How socially contrasting places in 
Fife, Scotland influence lay understandings of lifestyle and health behaviours in 
relation to coronary heart disease. Health & Place, 66, 102432. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2020.102432 
 
Mcgrath, L., Griffin, V., & Mundy, E. (2016). The Psychological Impact of Austerity: A 
Briefing Paper. Educational Psychology Research and Practice, 2(2), 46–57. 
 
Menzies, I. E. (1960). A case-study in the functioning of social systems as a defence 
against anxiety: A report on a study of the nursing service of a general 
hospital. Human relations, 13(2), 95-121. 
 
Morrow, V. M. (2000). ‘Dirty looks’ and ‘trampy places’ in young people’s accounts of 
community and neighbourhood: Implications for health inequalities. Critical Public 
Health, 10(2), 141–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/713658244 
 
Nutbeam, D. (Ed.). (2004). Getting evidence into policy and practice to address 




- 99 - 
 
Oliver, M. (1983). Social Work with Disabled People. Macmillan. 
 
Office of National Statistics. (2021). Coronavirus and the social impacts on disabled 





Orford, J. (2008). Community Psychology Challenges, Controversies and Emerging 
Consensus. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
 
Parry, J., Mathers, J., Laburn-Peart, C., Orford, J., & Dalton, S. (2007). Improving 
health in deprived communities: What can residents teach us? Critical Public Health, 
17(2), 123–136. https://doi.org/10.1080/09581590601045253 
 
Peacock, M. (2012). Women’s experiences of living in an unequal society: The place 
of shame, social comparison, and neoliberal discourses in explanation of inequalities 
in health. The Lancet, 380, S63. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)60419-5 
 
Peacock, M., Bissell, P., & Owen, J. (2014). Dependency denied: Health inequalities 
in the neo-liberal era. Social Science & Medicine, 118, 173–180. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.08.006 
 
Pescosolido, B. A., Martin, J. K., Long, J. S., Medina, T. R., Phelan, J. C., & Link, B. 
G. (2010). “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of Change in Public Reactions to 
Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 167(11), 1321–1330. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2010.09121743 
 
Pilgrim, D. (2017). Critical realism and mental health research. Routledge 
International Handbook of Critical Mental Health, 64. 
 
Pilgrim, D. (2019). Critical realism for psychologists. Routledge. 
 
  
- 100 - 
 
Pilgrim, D., & Rogers, A. (1993). A sociology of mental health and illness (pp. ix, 
198). Open University Press. 
 
Popay, J., Bennett, S., Thomas, C., Williams, G., Gatrell, A., & Bostock, L. (2003). 
Beyond ‘beer, fags, egg and chips’? Exploring lay understandings of social 
inequalities in health. Sociology of Health & Illness, 25(1), 1–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.t01-1-00322 
 
Popay, J., Thomas, C., Williams, G., Bennett, S., Gatrell, A., & Bostock, L. (2003). A 
proper place to live: Health inequalities, agency and the normative dimensions of 
space. Social Science & Medicine, 57(1), 55–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-
9536(02)00299-X 
 
Quinn, K., Bowleg, L., & Dickson-Gomez, J. (2019). “The fear of being Black plus the 
fear of being gay”: The effects of intersectional stigma on PrEP use among young 
Black gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men. Social Science & 
Medicine, 232(C), 86–93. 
 
Public Health England, 2019. Every Mind Matters. [online]. Gov.uk. Available at: 
Every Mind Matters | Campaign Resource Centre (phe.gov.uk) 
 
Raphael, D. (2006). Social Determinants of Health: Present Status, Unanswered 
Questions, and Future Directions. International Journal of Health Services, 36(4), 
651–677. https://doi.org/10.2190/3MW4-1EK3-DGRQ-2CRF 
 
Rapley, P. M. (2011). De-Medicalizing Misery Psychiatry, Psychology and the 
Human Condition. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 




- 101 - 
 
Read, J., Haslam, N., Sayce, L., & Davies, E. (2006). Prejudice and schizophrenia: A 
review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ approach. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 114(5), 303–318. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-0447.2006.00824.x 
 
Reindal, S. M. (1999). Independence, Dependence, Interdependence: Some 
reflections on the subject and personal autonomy. Disability & Society, 14(3), 353–
367. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599926190 
 
Ridley, M., Rao, G., Schilbach, F., & Patel, V. (2020). Poverty, depression, and 
anxiety: Causal evidence and mechanisms. Science, 370(6522), eaay0214. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aay0214 
 
Rind, E., & Jones, A. (2015). “I used to be as fit as a linnet” – Beliefs, attitudes, and 
environmental supportiveness for physical activity in former mining areas in the 
North-East of England. Social Science & Medicine, 126, 110–118. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.12.002 
 
Roberts, J. H. (2009). Structural violence and emotional health: A message from 
Easington, a former mining community in northern England. Anthropology & 
Medicine, 16(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13648470802425948 
 
Rose, W., & McAuley, C. (2019). Poverty and its impact on parenting in the UK: Re-
defining the critical nature of the relationship through examining lived experiences in 
times of austerity. Children and Youth Services Review, 97, 134–141.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2017.10.021 
 
Rose-Clarke, K., Gurung, D., Brooke-Sumner, C., Burgess, R., Burns, J., Kakuma, 
R., Kusi-Mensah, K., Ladrido-Ignacio, L., Maulik, P. K., Roberts, T., Walker, I. F., 
Williams, S., Yaro, P., Thornicroft, G., & Lund, C. (2020). Rethinking research on the 




- 102 - 
 
Sah, L. K., Burgess, R. A., & Sah, R. K. (2019). ‘Medicine doesn’t cure my worries’: 
Understanding the drivers of mental distress in older Nepalese women living in the 
UK. Global Public Health, 14(1), 65–79.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2018.1473888 
 
Schomerus, G., Matschinger, H., & Angermeyer, M. (2013). Causal beliefs of the 
public and social acceptance of persons with mental illness: A comparative analysis 
of schizophrenia, depression and alcohol dependence. Psychological Medicine, 44, 
1–12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329171300072X 
 




Smith, K. E. (2013). Beyond evidence-based policy in public health: The interplay of 
ideas. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Smith, K. E. (2017). In their own words: How do people in the UK understand the 
impacts of socioeconomic disadvantage on their mental health and risk factors for 
suicide? Socioeconomic Disadvantage And Suicidal Behaviour, 152. 
 
Smith, K. E., & Anderson, R. (2018). Understanding lay perspectives on 
socioeconomic health inequalities in Britain: A meta-ethnography. Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 40(1), 146–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.12629 
 
Smith, K. E., Bambra, C., & Hill, S. E. (2015). Health Inequalities: Critical 
Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 
https://pureportal.strath.ac.uk/en/publications/health-inequalities-critical-perspectives 
 
Stevens, A. (2011). Telling policy stories: An ethnographic study of the use of 
evidence in policy-making in the UK. Journal of Social Policy, 40(2), 237–256. 
 
  
- 103 - 
 
Spencer, L. & Ritchie, J. (2012) Establishing Good Quality Qualitative Research in 
Mental Health. In Harper, D. & Thompson, A. (eds)  Qualitative research methods in 
mental health and psychotherapy: An introduction for students and practitioners. (p. 
227-242). Chichester:  Wiley.  
 
Sweeney, P. (2015). The Psychiatric Diagnosis Debate: A Discursive Analysis of 
Public Comments Made Following Online News Articles about the Debate. [Pro_doc, 
University of East London]. https://doi.org/10.15123/PUB.4540 
 
Vassilev, I., Rogers, A., Sanders, C., Cheraghi-Sohi, S., Blickem, C., Brooks, H., 
Kapadia, D., Reeves, D., Doran, T., & Kennedy, A. (2014). Social status and living 
with a chronic illness: An exploration of assessment and meaning attributed to work 
and employment. Chronic Illness, 10(4), 273–290. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1742395314521641 
 
Ventevogel, P., Jordans, M., Reis, R., & de Jong, J. (2013). Madness or sadness? 
Local concepts of mental illness in four conflict-affected African communities. 
Conflict and Health, 7(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/1752-1505-7-3 
Watermeyer, B. (2013). Towards a contextual psychology of disablism (pp. ix, 248). 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
 
Watson, M., & Douglas, F. (2012). It’s making us look disgusting. . . And it makes me 
feel like a mink. . . It makes me feel depressed!: Using photovoice to help ‘see’ and 
understand the perspectives of disadvantaged young people about the 
neighbourhood determinants of their mental... International Journal of Health 
Promotion & Education, 50(6), 278–295. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14635240.2012.723379 
 
Wendell, S. (1996). The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on 
Disability. Routledge. 
 
White, G. W., Simpson, J. L., Gonda, C., Ravesloot, C., & Coble, Z. (2010). Moving 
from independence to interdependence: A conceptual model for better 
  
- 104 - 
 
understanding community participation of centers for independent living consumers. 
Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 20(4), 233–240. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1044207309350561 
 
Whitehead, M. (2007). A typology of actions to tackle social inequalities in health. 
Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 61(6), 473–478. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/jech.2005.037242 
 
Wilkinson, R., & Pickett, K. (2010). The spirit level. Why equality is better for 
everyone. 
 
Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2017). The enemy between us: The psychological 
and social costs of inequality. European Journal of Social Psychology, 47(1), 11–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2275 
 
Willig, C., & Rogers, W. S. (2017). The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in 
psychology. Sage. 
 
Wilson, G. B., Kaner, E. F. S., Crosland, A., Ling, J., McCabe, K., & Haighton, C. A. 
(2013). A Qualitative Study of Alcohol, Health and Identities among UK Adults in 
Later Life. PLOS ONE, 8(8), e71792. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0071792 
 
World Health Organization. (2014). Social determinants of mental health.  
 
Zubin, J., & Spring, B. (1977). Vulnerability: A new view of schizophrenia. Journal of 








- 105 - 
 
6.0 APPENDICES   
  
  
6.1 Appendix A - Reflexive Account: Constructing Ethical Research   
  
When constructing the research, it was essential to me that I did not contribute 
replicating epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) and marginalisation through knowledge 
production. I believe this occurs as the majority of research is people from White, 
Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Developed backgrounds (WEIRD) and so 
conclusions drawn from this population are assumed and applied to all. 
Intersectionality is key in undoing this gross negligence (Abrams et al., 2020). I 
myself however come from this WEIRD background and occupy many intersecting 
privileged social locations, including being white, middle class, cis-gendered and 
non-disabled. This leads to a significant risk of exploitation, where someone who 
does not belong to a community, enters the community, takes knowledge and 
leaves, without benefit to the community itself, replicating a history of colonising 
knowledge. One of the ways in which I endeavoured to manage this conflict was 
through paying participants for their time, representing a fundamental valuing of 
people’s time and knowledge. However, this unbeknownst to me at the time lead to 
another significant ethical issue. The University are subjected to Her Majesty’s 
Regulations and Customs’ (HMRC) regulations regarding payments and gifting 
vouchers, and as such the participants were required to complete a form confirming 
their receipt of the gift voucher, which included their National Insurance number. 
Having a disability entitles a person to state support including for example financial 
support if unable to work. These benefits are ‘means tested’, which means the 
level/amount of support is determined based upon an assessment of the level of 
need. This assessment is conducted through the Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP), which works closely with the HMRC. Understandably, some participants felt 
uncomfortable with providing this information, being unsure as to whether HMRC 
would alert the DWP to this receipt of the voucher, how the DWP might interpret or 
use this during means testing, for example, whether accepting this voucher would 
constitute a one off-payment for work, which may be taken in evidence against any 
claims of being unable to work. This potential, significant impact may deter disabled 
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people, who are unequally impacted by the distressing process of the DWP, from 
engaging in research, meaning that HMRC regulations are discriminatory in this 
sense. This maintains hegemonical knowledge production, which itself upholds 
discriminatory practice. The process of applying for ethical approval from the 
university did not incorporate the details of these forms. Had I been aware of the 
requirement of this form in advance, I would have included it in my ethical application 
in order to seek the University’s Ethical Committee’s guidance regarding this.  
 
My multiple and intersecting privileges, which have protected me needing personal 
interaction with the DWP, meant that I did not initially recognise the potentially 
impact of this. This is a demonstration of internalised ableism, present in seemingly 
innocuous everyday interactions that uphold systemic ableism (Afuape, 2011). It was 
deeply troubling to me that despite careful reflections and decision making, I had 
replicated harm. It is important to acknowledge the parallel barriers of discrimination 
faced whilst carrying out the research that can further lead to the exclusion of 
marginalised voices to ensure identification, and subsequently disruption of systemic 
barriers (Hankivsky & Christoffersen, 2008). It is vital to reflect upon my own 
relationship to systems of power and oppression, and it was due to a failure of this 
that systemic ableist privileges prevailed and inequality was replicated (Abrams et 
al., 2020). I was also concerned that institutionally, concerns regarding the NI 
number and this form appeared to have gone unnoticed and is an ongoing matter. 
This deeply concerned me and has contributed significantly to my anxiety regarding 
the risk reifying ableist systems when analysing the data through my own lens of 
bodily and economic privilege and security. I continue to believe, however, that it is 
vital for those of us who privilege from ableism to do the work to dismantle and 
disrupt this oppressive and hegemonical narrative/system, and I include this mistake 
explicitly in order to normalise taking accountability, apologising and moving forward 
from our own acts of discrimination.   
  
All aspects of the research, aside from voucher claim form, received ethical approval 
from the UEL Ethics Committee prior to its commencement. Aside from the issues 
with the form, which was (hopefully) quickly resolved for the participants, the 
research did not appear distressing to the participants. On the contrary, the majority 
of the participants expressed finding their participation beneficial, including for their 
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valued contribution to lived experience research, and for consideration of concepts 
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6.2 Appendix B – Ethical Approval   
  
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION  
 
For research involving human participants 
BSc/MSc/MA/Professional Doctorates in Clinical, Counselling and Educational Psychology 
 
 
REVIEWER: Hebba Haddad 
 
SUPERVISOR: David Harper     
 
STUDENT: Emily Dixon      
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
Title of proposed study: Underlying conceptual frameworks used to understand mental 
health in the context of a global pandemic   
 
DECISION OPTIONS:  
 
1. APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been 
granted from the date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is 
submitted for assessment/examination. 
 
2. APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE 
RESEARCH COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In this 
circumstance, re-submission of an ethics application is not required but the 
student must confirm with their supervisor that all minor amendments have 
been made before the research commences. Students are to do this by filling 
in the confirmation box below when all amendments have been attended to and 
emailing a copy of this decision notice to her/his supervisor for their records. 
The supervisor will then forward the student’s confirmation to the School for its 
records.  
 
3. NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION 
REQUIRED (see Major Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a 
revised ethics application must be submitted and approved before any research 
takes place. The revised application will be reviewed by the same reviewer. If 
in doubt, students should ask their supervisor for support in revising their ethics 
application.  
 
DECISION ON THE ABOVE-NAMED PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY 
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Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
3.7 – Data collection. Please be sure the method of data collection will be suitably conduced 
within lockdown rules at the time. Currently, this should be using MS Teams. Face-to-face 
interviews should only be conducted when safe to do so and social distancing and all related 























Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before starting 
my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature):  




(Please submit a copy of this decision letter to your supervisor with this box completed, if 
minor amendments to your ethics application are required) 
 
 
        
ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 
Has an adequate risk assessment been offered in the application form? 
 
YES / NO  
 
Please request resubmission with an adequate risk assessment 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, physical 
or health and safety hazard? Please rate the degree of risk: 
  






Please do not approve a high risk application and refer to the Chair of Ethics. Travel to 
countries/provinces/areas deemed to be high risk should not be permitted and an application 
not approved on this basis. If unsure please refer to the Chair of Ethics. 
 
 


















Reviewer (Typed name to act as signature):   Hebba Haddad  
 
Date:  22.06.20 
 
This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study on 






RESEARCHER PLEASE NOTE: 
 
For the researcher and participants involved in the above named study to be covered by 
UEL’s Insurance, prior ethics approval from the School of Psychology (acting on behalf of 
the UEL Research Ethics Committee), and confirmation from students where minor 
amendments were required, must be obtained before any research takes place.  
 
 
For a copy of UELs Personal Accident & Travel Insurance Policy, please see the 
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School of Psychology  
Stratford Campus  
Water Lane   
London   




PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF LETTER  
  
  
Thank you for participating in my research study. This letter offers information that may be 
relevant in light of you having now taken part.    
  
What will happen to the information that you have provided?  
Your interview has been recorded on an audio recorder and only I will type them into 
transcripts. I will anonymise the transcript by changing any information which might identify 
you (e.g. the names of people or places).  I will delete the audio file from the recorder 
straight after the interview but will keep a back-up copy in password-protected computer 
files.  I may include anonymised quotes from our interview in the write-up of the study.  The 
transcripts will be kept for five years on a personal password protected computer and might 
be used for additional articles or publications based on the research.  I will delete the audio 
files after my thesis has been examined.  The audio files or typed transcript may be accessed 
by the researcher’s supervisor at the University of East London and/or the examiners who 
assess the thesis. No one else will have access to the transcripts or audio recordings.  
If you change your mind and would like to withdraw your data from the research, you can 
do so without providing reason and with no disadvantage to yourself. You have 3 weeks 
from today to do so.   
What if you have been adversely affected by taking part?  
It is not anticipated that you will have been adversely affected by taking part in the 
research. Nevertheless, it is still possible that your participation or its after-effects may have 
been upsetting. You may find the following resources/services helpful:   
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• Your GP if you would like to access your local NHS mental health support   
• The Samaritans helpline:  116 123 (free 24 hour helpline)  
• Mind: 0300 123 3393 (Monday to Friday, 9am to 6pm)  
• Sane (emotional support, information and guidance for those affected by 
mental health difficulties, their families and carers: 0300 304 7000 (daily, 4:30pm 
to 10:30pm). Textcare: www.sane.org.uk/textcare.  
• CALM is the Campaign Against Living Miserably, for men aged 15 to 35. 
Phone: 0800 58 58 58 (daily, 5pm to midnight)  
  
You are also very welcome to contact me or my supervisor if you have specific questions or 
concerns.  
  
Contact Details  
If you would like further information about my research or have any questions or concerns, 
please do not hesitate to contact me:  
  
Emily Dixon. Email: u1826611@uel.ac.uk  
  
If you have any questions or concerns about how the research has been conducted please 
contact the research supervisor Professor David Harper. School of Psychology, University of 
East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ,   
Email: d.harper@uel.ac.uk   
  
or   
  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr Tim Lomas, School of 
Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ.  
(Email: t.lomas@uel.ac.uk  










































6.4 Appendix D – Interview Schedule   
  
Thesis Interview schedule  
  
1. What comes to mind when I say ‘mental health’?    
• Types of mental health problems aware of?    
• Personal experience (e.g. someone they know)?   
• How different from normal experience?   
  




2.  What do you think causes mental health problem X [i.e. one they are familiar with]? 
    
• If they give more comprehensive answers you could maybe introduce the 
prompts from section 3 here   
• How think X causes [mental health problem]?    
• Specific to that problem or also relevant to [other problem they mentioned]?   
  
    
3. I’m going to mention some things that some people think are reasons why people 
develop [mental health problems].  To what extent do they play a role in [mental health 
problem] X?   
o For all:  If so, how?  Why some people and not others?   
• Negative life events (i.e. things that have happened to people) [bereavement, 
workplace stress, trauma etc).    
• Relationships with others (e.g. family, friendships, neighbours, workmates 
etc).   
• Amount of money (e.g. income, welfare, debt etc).   
• Where you live (housing, neighbourhood etc).    
• Being a man/woman; ethnicity; employed/unemployed; disability etc.   
• Biology (e.g. the kind of body we are born with, genes etc).    
• Individual factors (such as personality, resilience, lifestyle choices).    
• Religiom/spirituality  
  
  
4.  What do you think keeps people mentally well?     
• How does X [i.e. financial security] keep people well?     
• Do only some people have X?   Why/not?   
  
  
5.  Where did you get these ideas from?      
  
  

























6.5 Appendix E – Participant Information Sheet  
  
  
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON  
School of Psychology  
Stratford Campus  
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Water Lane   
London   
E15 4LZ  
Consent to Participate in a Research Study   
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider 
in deciding whether to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted as part 
of my Clinical Psychology Doctoral degree at the University of East London.   
 
Project Title   
How is mental health, its causes and prevention understood by disabled members of the 
public?  1 
 
What is the study about?   
The aim of the study is to understand what you understand “mental health” to mean, what 
might be the causes of mental health difficulties and what may prevent them. I am doing 
this study for my thesis as part of my training as a clinical psychologist.   
 
Why have you been asked to participate?  
I am interested in interviewing members of the public. I emphasise that I am not looking for 
‘experts’ on the causes of mental health. On the contrary, I think that members of the 
general population have an ‘expert’ understanding of mental health, because we 
all experience it. It is this type of ‘expert’ knowledge I am seeking. You will not be judged or 
personally analysed in any way and will be treated with respect. You are quite free to decide 
whether or not to participate and should not feel coerced.    
  
What will taking part involve?   
I would like to invite you to be interviewed by myself. I will ask you how you understand 
mental health, the causes of mental health difficulties and what you think prevents this. The 
discussion will be in general terms and I will not be asking you questions about any personal 
experience, although you can bring this in if you would like.  
 
 
1 This title reflects the name of the study as it was at the time of data collection 
  
- 118 - 
 
What are the risks and benefits of taking part?  
Since I will be asking general questions I do not think there are any significant risks to taking 
part. Some upset is possible if you discuss something personal, though I will not be asking 
questions about this. If you do become upset we could take a break and/or you could 
withdraw from the study. I can provide a list of organisations if you felt you needed 
further support. You will receive a £10 Amazon voucher for your participation. You would 
also be helping to contribute to our knowledge about mental health.  
  
Your taking part will be safe and confidential   
Each interview will be with me. I will record the interview and then transcribe (i.e. type it 
up) afterwards. I will anonymise the transcript by changing any information which might 
identify you (e.g. the names of people and places). I will delete the audio file from the 
recorder straight after the interview but I will keep a back-up copy in password-protected 
computer files. I may include anonymised quotes from our interview in the write up of the 
study. The transcripts will be kept for five years on a personal password-protected 
computer and might be used for additional articles or publication based on the research. I 
will delete audio files after my thesis has been examined. The audio files or typed transcript 
may be accessed by the researcher’s supervisor at the University of East London and/or the 
examiners who assess the thesis. No one else will have access to the transcripts or audio 
recordings.  
 
Location   
Interviews with me will be held over the telephone or online, depending on which you 
prefer.   
 
What if I want to withdraw?   
You are not obliged to take part in this study. If you decide to take part, you are free to 
change your mind and withdraw at any time before or during the interview. After the 
interviews have taken place, you can contact me and withdraw your data within 3 weeks 
from the date the interview was conducted (after this I will have begun my analysis). Should 
you choose to withdraw from the study you may do so without any disadvantage to yourself 
and without any obligation to give a reason.  
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Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are happy to continue you will be asked to 
sign a consent form prior to your participation. Please retain this invitation letter for 
reference.   
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, please 
contact the research’s supervisor: Professor David Harper, School of Psychology, University 
of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. Telephone: 020 8223 4021. Email: 
d.harper@uel.ac.uk.   
  
or   
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr Tim Lomas, School of 
Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ.  
Tel: 020 8223 4493. Email: t.lomas@uel.ac.uk  
Thank you in anticipation. Yours sincerely,  
Emily Dixon (Principal Investigator)  
u1826611@uel.ac.uk  
  






6.6 Appendix F – Participant Consent Form  
  
  
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON  
School of Psychology  
Stratford Campus  
Water Lane   
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London   
E15 4LZ  
Consent to participate in a research study  
  How is mental health, its causes and prevention understood by disabled members of the 
public?  2 
I have the read the information sheet relating to the above research study and have been 
given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, 
and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions. I understand what is 
being proposed and the procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me.   
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, will 
remain strictly confidential. Only the researcher involved in the study will have access to 
identifying data. It has been explained to me what will happen once the research study has 
been completed.   
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully explained to 
me. Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study 
without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to give any reason.   
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
....................................................................................................   
Participant’s Signature  
 .....................................................................................................   
Researcher’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  










2 2 This title reflects the name of the study as it was at the time of data collection 
  























6.7 Appendix G – Example Thematic Map  
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6.8 Appendix H – Presentation Key   
  
I have made minor changes to the interview extracts for their presentation and 
readability. Where superfluous words that do not add to the overall meaning 
conveyed have been omitted to shorten quotes, a dotted lined within square brackets 
[…] is depicted. Where an addition to the text has been made to offer further 
explanation to reader that was dependent on previous utterances, square brackets 
[text] are depicted. Pauses have been represented by doted lines … .  Some ‘filler’ 
words and repetitions of these within extracts have been removed for clarity 
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REQUEST FOR TITLE CHANGE TO AN ETHICS APPLICATION 
 
 
 FOR BSc, MSc/MA & TAUGHT PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE STUDENTS  
 
 
Please complete this form if you are requesting approval for proposed title change to an 
ethics application that has been approved by the School of Psychology. 
 
By applying for a change of title request you confirm that in doing so the process by which 
you have collected your data/conducted your research has not changed or deviated from 
your original ethics approval. If either of these have changed then you are required to 
complete an Ethics Amendments Form. 
 
 
HOW TO COMPLETE & SUBMIT THE REQUEST  
 
Complete the request form electronically and accurately. 
Type your name in the ‘student’s signature’ section (page 2). 
Using your UEL email address, email the completed request form along with associated documents 
to: Psychology.Ethics@uel.ac.uk  
Your request form will be returned to you via your UEL email address with reviewer’s response box 





A copy of the approval of your initial ethics application. 
Name of applicant:   Emily Dixon    
Programme of study:   Doctorate of Clinical Psychology 
Name of supervisor:  Professor David Harper 
 
 
Briefly outline the nature of your proposed title change in the boxes below 
 
Proposed amendment Rationale 
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Old Title:  
 
Underlying conceptual frameworks used 
to understand mental health in the 
context of a global pandemic 
 
 
Changed to remove the reference to the 
pandemic, as this was not discussed or 
included at length in the write up so is not 
relevant for the title.  
New Title:  
 
Underlying conceptual frameworks used to 
understand mental health by disabled 
members of the UK general public 
 
 
Please tick YES NO 
Is your supervisor aware of your proposed amendment(s) and 
agree to them? 
X  
Does your change of title impact the process of how you collected 




Student’s signature (please type your name):  Emily Dixon   
 




TO BE COMPLETED BY REVIEWER 
 
 










Reviewer: Trishna Patel 
 
Date:  02/09/2021 
 
